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In 2007, “Emely” fled a violent Central American country, hoping for
protection in the United States (U.S.) from a male gang leader who, intending to
“cure” her of her sexual orientation, raped and impregnated her.1 But when
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers apprehended Emely near the
border after she entered the U.S. without inspection, no one asked her about this
or any other past experience, despite being required to do so.2 Instead, the CBP
officer instructed Emely, who does not speak English and has only a sixth grade
education, to sign a form written in English.3 Then, without ever appearing
before an immigration judge, Emely was deported.4 This process is known as
“expedited removal.”5 It applies when a noncitizen seeks entry with fraudulent
or no travel documents, or when a noncitizen is apprehended within 100 miles
of the border within two weeks of entering without inspection.6 It is the most
1. Where indicated, this Article uses pseudonyms to protect the confidentiality of individuals
with pending claims. Emely’s records are on file with the Author’s law office.
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that immigration officers must screen
noncitizens flagged for expedited removal and refer those who indicate a fear of persecution or
intent to apply for asylum to a credible fear interview with an asylum officer).
3. See supra note 1 (DHS records indicate that CBP noted on this form that Emely expressed
no fear of removal when asked about it, and was “amenable” to expedited removal.).
4. Id.
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (outlining that certain noncitizens must be expeditiously removed
without a hearing unless they indicate a fear of persecution or an intention to apply for asylum);
see also JOHN F. SIMANSKI, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS:
2013 2 (Sept. 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_20
13.pdf (defining “expedited removal” as “removal without a hearing before an immigration judge
of an alien arriving in the United States who is inadmissible because the individual does not possess
valid entry documents or is inadmissible for fraud or misrepresentation of material fact; or the
removal of an alien who has not been admitted or paroled in the United States and who has not
affirmatively shown to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien had been physically
present in the United States for the immediately preceding 2-year period”).
6. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7), which renders
noncitizens inadmissible if they do not possess valid travel documents); see also Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 6
(2014) (“Expedited removal applies to persons who arrive at a port-of-entry or within 100 miles of
the border with fraudulent or insufficient documents.”). As originally enacted, Congress mandated
expedited removal for any noncitizens arriving in the U.S. without valid travel documents, except
for Cubans arriving by plane. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(1)(F). At the same time, however,
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common method by which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
removes noncitizens. 7 These removal orders are completely insulated from
judicial review.8
A few months later, Emely fled to the U.S. again.9 Shortly after entering
without inspection for a second time, CBP apprehended her. Because she had
illegally reentered the country after being deported pursuant to a final order of
removal, CBP reinstated her prior removal order and, without asking about her
fear of removal, again deported her.10 This process is known as “reinstatement
of removal.”11 It is triggered when a noncitizen illegally reenters the U.S. after
being removed or voluntarily departing pursuant to final order of removal. 12
When a noncitizen’s prior order is reinstated, they are permanently barred from
applying for or receiving “any relief” under the Immigration and Nationality Act
Congress also gave the Attorney General the “sole and unreviewable discretion” to expand the
application of expedited removal “at any time” to include undocumented noncitizens apprehended
inside the United States within two years of entry. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). The Attorney General
has exercised this authority several times over the past twenty years; today, the following
noncitizens are subject to expedited removal proceedings: non-Cuban noncitizens arriving at portsof-entry without valid travel documents, undocumented non-Cuban noncitizens who entered by sea
within two years of their apprehension, and undocumented noncitizens apprehended within 100
miles of the border within two weeks of their entry without inspection. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (nonCuban aliens arriving at ports of entry); Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal
Under Section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,924,
68,924–25 (Nov. 13, 2002) (undocumented non-Cuban aliens entering by sea within two years of
their apprehension); Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,877 (Aug.
11, 2004) (undocumented aliens apprehended within 100 miles of the border within two weeks of
their entry).
7. SIMANSKI, supra note 5, at 5 tbl.7 (showing that in the fiscal year of 2013, the majority
of all removed noncitizens were expedited removals).
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (providing that noncitizens must be removed pursuant to
expedited removal orders “without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an
intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution”); 8 C.F.R. §
235.3(b)(7) (2016) (providing that at least a “second line supervisor” must review interviewing
officer’s expedited removal order before it is final; this review must include “a review of the sworn
statement and any answers and statements made by the alien regarding a fear of removal or return”);
see also David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 40
VA. J. INT’L L. 673, 686 (2000) (noting that in expedited removal, a “[CBP] officer can serve such
an [expedited removal] order after the secondary inspection interview, but only following review
of the sworn statement and proposed order by a high-level supervisor. The process takes a matter
of hours . . . .”).
9. See supra note 1.
10. Id. (CBP records indicate that when asked, Emely did not express a fear of removal;
however, Emely claims she was never asked about her fear during this reinstatement interview.).
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) states:
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after
having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior
order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened
or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter,
and the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.
12. Id.
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(INA). 13 Reinstatement of removal is the second most common method of
removal. 14 Like expedited removal orders, reinstated orders of removal are
issued by CBP officers and are not subject to judicial review.15 In fiscal year
(FY) 2015, DHS removed 165,935 noncitizens through expedited and reinstated
of removal orders (70.49% of all removals).16
In 2014, Emely’s rapist began phone stalking her from prison, demanding to
have sex with her, and threatening to kill her if she refused.17 After the rapist’s
messenger approached her in her neighborhood, and warned her that she would
be abducted and taken to the rapist soon, Emely fled to the U.S., again making
the weeks-long, arduous journey across Central America and Mexico, and
ultimately wading through the Rio Grande into the U.S.18
Shortly after illegally entering for a third time, CBP apprehended Emely and
placed her in reinstatement of removal proceedings again.19 However, this time,
CBP asked Emely whether she had a fear of removal. Emely answered that she
did, and CBP referred her to a “reasonable fear” interview; the first step in
obtaining a form of relief from removal called “withholding of removal.” 20
After being found to have a “reasonable fear” of persecution in that interview,
Emely’s claim was sent to an immigration judge for a hearing on the merits of
her withholding of removal claim. 21 These proceedings are referred to as
“withholding-only” pursuant to federal regulations mandating that noncitizens
with reinstated removal orders may apply for withholding of removal only—not
asylum.22 Thus, because of her reinstated removal order, Emely was deprived
of the chance to apply for asylum.23
13. Id.
14. SIMANSKI, supra note 5, at 5 tbl.7 (reporting that of the noncitizens removed in the fiscal
year 2013, 170,247 (38.8%) were removed pursuant to reinstated orders of removal).
15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (providing that a reinstated removal order “is not subject to
being reopened or reviewed”); see also Wadhia, supra note 6, at 8 (noting that reinstated removal
orders that are unilaterally issued by the DHS are not subject to any judicial review; however, when
an immigration judge denies a noncitizen’s withholding of removal claim and issues a reinstated
removal order, the noncitizen can appeal the legality of this reinstated removal order to “a federal
court of appeals through a legal vehicle called a ‘petition for review.’”).
16. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2015 8 (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Report/2016/fy2015removalStats.pdf.
17. See supra note 1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1), 208.31(c) (2016) (defining a “reasonable fear” as
a “reasonable possibility” that the noncitizen will be persecuted or tortured on a protected ground
in his home country).
22. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (providing that noncitizens expressing a fear of persecution or torture
must be referred to an asylum officer for a “reasonable fear” interview).
23. See supra note 1. During her withholding-only proceedings, the presiding immigration
judge found Emely was credible, but still denied her claim, finding Emely, who was pro se, had not
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The difference between withholding of removal and asylum is dramatic. To
begin with, the legal standard for establishing withholding of removal eligibility
is significantly higher than the asylum standard, and therefore more difficult to
meet.24 Moreover, considering reports that immigration judges find only 2% of
pro se applicants eligible for asylum, the likelihood of obtaining withholding of
removal when pro se is nearly impossible. 25 Additionally, the legal benefits
flowing from withholding are scant compared to those flowing from asylum.
Noncitizens granted asylum are placed on a path to citizenship, are granted work
authorization, and are permitted to travel outside the country. 26 By contrast,
withholding affords only the right not to be removed to the country of
persecution; it neither confers a right to remain in the U.S., nor protection from

established eligibility for withholding. Meeting the withholding standard is far more difficult than
establishing asylum eligibility, and even that is nearly impossible to do for pro se litigants. In May
2015, the Author represented Emely in her appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and
argued the BIA should remand because, among other things, the federal regulation mandating these
“withholding-only” proceedings conflicts with the INA. The BIA remanded, but on other grounds,
and without addressing the regulation’s validity. In March of 2017, an immigration judge granted
Emely withholding of removal.
24. See, e.g., Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2010).
Withholding of removal requires the petitioner to demonstrate his or her “life or freedom
would be threatened in that country because of the petitioner’s race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Similar to asylum, a
petitioner may establish eligibility for withholding of removal (A) by establishing a
presumption of fear of future persecution based on past persecution, or (B) through an
independent showing of clear probability of future persecution.
Unlike asylum, however, the petitioner must show a “clear probability” of the threat to
life or freedom if deported to his or her country of nationality. The Supreme Court has
defined “clear probability” to mean “it is more likely than not” that the petitioner would
be subject to persecution on account of one of the protected grounds. The clear
probability standard is more stringent than the well-founded fear standard for asylum.
Id. at 1091 (citations omitted).
25. Charles Kuck, Legal Assistance for Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal: A Survey of
Alternative Practices, in 2 REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: EXPERT
REPORTS 239 (2005), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_
seekers/ERS_RptVolII.pdf (“Of those individuals found to have a credible fear, who were
subsequently represented by counsel, 25[%] were granted asylum by an Immigration Judge;
whereas, only 2[%] of those not represented by counsel were granted asylum.” (footnotes omitted));
see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY2014 STATISTICS YEARBOOK K5 fig.20 (Mar. 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fy14syb.pdf (reporting that in the
FY2014, immigration courts granted only 1,463 withholding-of-removal claims, and denied the
remaining 11,052 claims); see also Julianne Hing, What’s the Difference Between a Refugee and a
Deportee? A Lawyer., THE NATION (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/whats-thedifference-between-and-a-refugee-and-a-deportee-a-lawyer/ (quoting Lisa Koop of the National
Immigrant Justice Center stating that “[f]or someone who’s a bona fide asylum seeker, the single
biggest factor which determines whether they’re able to secure protection is whether they have an
attorney”).
26. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FACT SHEET:
ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL RELIEF, CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
PROTECTIONS (Jan. 15, 2009), http://1.usa.gov/1nOG2q9.
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removal to any other country, nor the ability to travel outside the country.27 This
“relief” from removal essentially places the noncitizen in immigration
purgatory, belonging nowhere indefinitely yet separated forever from their
family.28 Thus, pursuant to the withholding-only regulation, a removal order,
most often issued during expedited removal proceedings by a low-level CBP
officer with no judicial oversight, carries serious consequences for noncitizens
fleeing persecution, who, like Emely, find themselves stuck in the reinstatement
pipeline based on a removal order that was entered in error to begin with.
This Article is the first academic piece to argue that the reinstatement of prior
orders of removal should not bar individuals like Emely from access to asylum.
Part I provides background about the legislative history that gave rise to the
regulatory scheme that restricts individuals with reinstated orders of removal to
withholding of removal access only. Part II examines a circuit split regarding
the proper interpretation of the INA and the regulatory scheme, and argues that
it is unreasonable to interpret the INA as prohibiting individuals with reinstated
orders from applying for asylum. Part III presents policy arguments that further
support why reinstated removal should not bar a noncitizen’s access to asylum.
These policy arguments emphasize numerous errors that are routinely made by
border patrol agents in issuing expedited removal orders, including their failure
to ask mandatory questions designed to assess whether the individual has a fear
of being harmed in her country of origin. Finally, Part IV makes specific
recommendations to the DHS, immigration courts, federal appellate courts, and
Congress to help ensure that bona fide asylum seekers receive proper protection
in the U.S.
I. IIRIRA’S REVISIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS: THE STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY BASIS FOR DENYING ASYLUM ACCESS TO NONCITIZENS WITH
REINSTATED REMOVAL ORDERS
The expedited and reinstatement removal methods, in addition to the
withholding-only regulatory scheme, stem from the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Before IIRIRA, a
noncitizen could not be removed from the U.S. without first appearing before an

27. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1999) (“Whereas withholding only
bars deporting an alien to a particular country or countries, a grant of asylum permits an alien to
remain in the United States and to apply for permanent residency after one year.”); see also Letter
from Ten Immigration and Human Rights Orgs. to John Roth, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. & Megan H. Mack, Officer of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 6 (Nov.
13, 2014) [hereinafter Right to Asylum Letter], http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/Right-toAsylum-CRCL-Complaint-Cover-Letter.pdf (noting that “[a] grant of withholding of removal,
unlike a grant of asylum, does not allow an applicant to sponsor a spouse or children for derivative
status,” thereby “forc[ing the noncitizen] to choose between reuniting with family and
compromising their own safety” (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 26)).
28. See Right to Asylum Letter, supra note 27.
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immigration judge. 29 If the noncitizen raised an asylum claim during this
appearance, the immigration judge would determine whether the noncitizen is a
“refugee,”—that is, the noncitizen either suffered past persecution or has a
“well-founded fear” of future persecution—and is therefore eligible for
asylum. 30 “[V]irtually all immigration court decisions,” including asylum
eligibility decisions, “could be appealed to a regular federal court and decided
by judges who, unlike immigration judges, were independent of the Department
of Justice and had life tenure.”31 But, as Emely’s story illustrated, IIRIRA’s new
expedited removal and reinstatement procedures changed things significantly,
especially for asylum seekers,32 who comprise approximately 22% (51,001) of
the noncitizens in expedited removal each year.33
This Part sets forth the background to the relevant changes IIRIRA made to
the INA, which resulted in the promulgation of the withholding-only regulatory
scheme. It first discusses the political climate in which IIRIRA was crafted;
29. PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO SAVE
POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 228–29 (2000).
30. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 (1987) (finding a “refugee” is “any person
who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no
nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable
or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1980)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i) (2016) (providing that a fear
of persecution is “well-founded” if (A) she has a fear of persecution in her country; (B) there is a
reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution; and (C) she is unable or unwilling to return to
that country because of such fear.) The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General
are the ultimate authorities on whether asylum is granted; even if an immigration judge finds an
applicant eligible, the Attorney General can still deny asylum relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A)
(2012) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien
who has applied for asylum . . . .”).
31. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 228–29 (noting that noncitizens won 25–40% of these appeals,
indicating that immigration judges make “a lot of” procedural and substantive errors).
32. See Kate Jastram & Tala Hartsough, A-File and Record of Proceeding Analysis of
Expedited Removal, in 2 REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: EXPERT
REPORTS 52 (2005), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seek
ers/ERS_RptVolII.pdf (noting that refugees fleeing from persecution often use “false documents
or documents obtained by misrepresentation,” which triggers their placement in expedited removal,
because “they are often unable to obtain a passport or visa in their own name and must leave their
country surreptitiously”).
33. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.
OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 59 (June 29, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/2015%20CISOMB%20Annual%20Report_508.pdf (reporting that in FY2014,
USCIS received 51,001 credible fear referrals). The most recent data the DHS has released
itemizing the number of noncitizens removed through expedited removal was for FY2013.
See SIMANSKI, supra note 5, at 2. Based on an average growth trend from fiscal years 2011 through
2013 (35,398) added to the 193,032 expeditiously removed in FY2013, approximately 228,430
people were expeditiously removed in FY2014. Thus, 51,001 credible fear interview referrals
issued in FY2014 represents 22% of the approximate number of all people expeditiously removed
in FY2014.

620

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 66:613

namely, Americans’ anti-immigrant sentiment and belief that the asylum system
was being abused, which is important to understanding Congress’s intent when
it simultaneously amended the asylum and reinstatement provisions and created
the expedited removal process. This Part then discusses the changes IIRIRA
made to these statutory provisions, and the subsequent promulgation of the
withholding-only regulatory scheme. It then concludes with facts from several
cases that illustrate the outcome this regulatory scheme has on bona fide asylum
seekers.
A. Legislative Context: The American Anti-Immigrant, Anti-Asylum Seeker
Political Environment of the 1990s
Americans’ anti-immigrant sentiment increased significantly in the three
decades leading up to the 1996 enactment of IIRIRA.34 By the mid-1990s, this
sentiment had reached a fever pitch. 35 This trend was partly due to a weak
economy.36 It was also due to two unprecedented terror attacks committed on
American soil by lawfully present asylum seekers.37
The first attack occurred in January 1993, when a Pakistani asylum-seeker
named Mir Aimal Kasi gunned down Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
employees who were waiting in their cars at a stoplight just outside Agency
headquarters. 38 Kasi shot an AK-47 eleven times, and killed two men and
wounded three others.39 Kasi had entered the U.S. on a business visa in 1991,
and about a year later, filed an asylum application that “included few details of
the political persecution he claimed to fear in Pakistan.”40 This application was
still pending when he attacked the CIA employees.41
34. Joseph Carroll, American Public Opinion About Immigration, GALLUP (July 26, 2005),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/14785/immigration.aspx (explaining that from 1965 to 1995, the
number of polled Americans who believed that immigration should be decreased nearly doubled—
from 33% in 1965 to 65% in 1995).
35. Id. (showing that from 1985 to 2005, the highest percentage of polled Americans who
favored a decrease in immigration occurred from July 1993 through June 1995).
36. Seth Mydans, Poll Finds Tide of Immigration Brings Hostility, N.Y. TIMES (June 27,
1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/27/us/poll-finds-tide-of-immigration-brings-hostility.ht
ml (analyzing the growing “public reaction against immigration,” and noting that of the Americans
polled, “[m]any cited the economy as a factor in their opinion”).
37. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 38–39; Mydans, supra note 36 (quoting the then-director of
the Refugee Project of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, “[i]f you can picture the image
of the Statue of Liberty dissolving and being replaced by the image of the World Trade Center after
it was bombed, you have the sense of the negative trends in the current debate”).
38. Richard A. Serrano, Pakistani Who Killed 2 at CIA Is Executed, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 15,
2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/nov/15/nation/na-execute15 (“Just as CIA employees were
reporting to work on Jan. 25, 1993, Kasi stepped out of his pickup and began firing an AK-47 rifle
near the entrance to the agency’s headquarters.”).
39. Id.
40. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 38.
41. Id.; see also Serrano, supra note 38 (reporting that on November 14, 2002, Mir Aimal
Kasi was executed by lethal injection).
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The second attack occurred about a month later, when another asylum seeker
with Pakistani connections, Ramzi Yousef, detonated a car bomb in New York
City’s World Trade Center parking garage. 42 Six people died, and over a
thousand others were wounded.43 It was “‘the largest-scale bombing on U.S.
soil in modern history’ in terms of fatalities and material damage.” 44 It
“generated so much physical force that it created a five-story crater.”45 Yousef
entered the U.S. after requesting asylum at the Kennedy Airport; he was not
detained prior to his asylum hearing because the nearest detention center was
full, “as usual.”46 His asylum application was still pending when, only a month
after arriving in the U.S., he detonated the bomb.47 He flew back to Pakistan
within hours of the explosion.48
Prior to these attacks, New York Immigration and Nationality Services
District Director William Slattery had complained for years that noncitizens
arriving at Kennedy Airport were purposely abusing the asylum process by
making false claims of persecution, knowing that they would be allowed to enter
indefinitely—and given work authorization immediately.49 With America still
reeling from these terror attacks, Slattery “seized the moment to make public
appearances railing against the humanitarian leniencies of the asylum system,”

42. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 39.
43. Richard A. Serrano, After 15 Years in Solitary, Convicted Terrorist Pleads for Contact
with Others, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/16/nation/la-nayousef-solitary-20130217.
44. Douglas Jehl, Car Bombs: A Tool of Foreign Terror, Little Known in U.S., N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 27, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/27/nyregion/explosion-twin-towers-car-bombstool-foreign-terror-little-known-us.html (quoting terrorism expert Brian Jenkins).
45. Matt Pearce, 20 Years Ago, a Bomb Killed Six People at the World Trade Center, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/26/nation/la-na-nn-1993-world-tradecenter-anniversary-20130226 (reporting that “the blast also generated so much emotional force that
officials erected a granite memorial—a fountain—bearing the victims’ names”: John DiGiovanni,
Robert Kirkpatrick, Stephen Knapp, William Macko, Wilfred Mercado, and Monica Rodriguez
Smith, who was pregnant).
46. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 39.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Serrano, supra note 43 (reporting that Yousef was later brought back to the
U.S. where, in addition to the World Trade Center bombing, “he was also convicted of trying to
kill Pope John Paul II and President Clinton and trying to bomb 11 airliners on their way from Asia
to the U.S.” At his sentencing, Yousef unapologetically told the judge: “Yes, I am a terrorist, and
proud of it.” He is currently “serving life with no parole plus 240 years.” He has been in 24-hour
solitary confinement for the past fifteen years. His cell is 7-by-11 feet, has no bars, and one small
window. His meals are “shoved by unseen guards through a sally port between two steel doors.”
His uncle, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, is believed to be the September 11 mastermind.).
49. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 39–40, 246 (discussing procedural issues with processing
asylum claims in the 1990s, such as the “INS policy of granting work authorization to all affirmative
asylum applicants without creating an adjudication staff large enough to interview the applicants
promptly, and laws and regulations that provided scant preliminary asylum screening and
inadequate detention space at ports of entry, particularly New York, which seemed swamped by
aliens arriving with false documents”).
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hoping that by playing the “media card,” he would get Congress’s attention.50
This publicity campaign included interviews with Newsday, the Los Angeles
Times, and the New York Times, where he reported that two-thirds of asylum
applicants leave Kennedy Airport, never to be seen again, and that “people know
they’ve got a 93% chance of walking right through into the United States,”
because “only 7% of all inadmissible aliens are detained.”51
But rather than encouraging Congress to build more detention centers, he told
reporters that “Congress must change the law to allow him to send most of them
packing after a quick hearing at Kennedy . . . . The aliens have taken control.”52
This idea of “summary exclusion,” or “expedited removal” as it was later
enacted, was not new; a Senator had unsuccessfully advocated for it during the
Reagan administration.53
In March 1993, Mr. Slattery did an interview with 60 Minutes that generated
“massive” national attention.54 As video footage cut between scenes of terrorists
and immigrants arriving at Kennedy Airport played on screen, 60 Minutes
reporter Lesley Stahl’s voice explained that Sheik Rahman—an asylum-seeker
in the U.S. who had been charged with plotting terror attacks on U.S. landmarks
and who had connections to the World Trade Center bomber—was “just one of
hundreds of thousands of foreigners who have found an almost foolproof
formula to stay in the United States.”55 One of Ms. Stahl’s guests stated that
“every single person on the planet Earth . . . can stay [in the U.S.] indefinitely
by saying two magic words: political asylum.”56 Mr. Slattery agreed, stating
that “you don’t know what they have done, you really don’t even know their real
names, and minimum, they’re in this country for eighteen months.”57
In the months following the 60 Minutes broadcast, anti-immigrant sentiment
in the U.S. reached a record high. 58 Nearly 70% of Americans favored a
decrease in immigration, and 68% believed that “most of the people who have

50. Deborah Sontag, Waiting for a Rudder at I.N.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/13/nyregion/waiting-for-a-rudder-at-ins.html (reporting that at
the time, “advocates for immigrants ha[d] long criticized the Immigration and Naturalization
Service for its backlogged system, [and] Mr. Slattery and other officials turned the tables, blaming
the supposedly crafty immigrants who stormed the gates”); see also SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 40
(author and Georgetown University Law Center Professor Philip G. Schrag’s personal interview
with Slattery in which Mr. Slattery stated he intentionally “play[ed] the media card”).
51. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 40–41.
52. Id. at 41.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 42–43.
55. Id. at 42.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 43.
58. Carroll, supra note 34 (discussing data showing that from 1985 to 2005, the highest
percentage of polled Americans (65%) who favored a decrease in immigration occurred from July
1993 through June 1995); see also Mydans, supra note 36 (finding that 61% of polled Americans
favored a decrease in immigration in June 1993).
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moved to the United States in the last few years are here illegally.” 59 For
context, in 1986, less than half of Americans shared these views.60 This new
social trend “imparted real power to political demands for a retrenchment,” and
Congressional hearings “proliferated on what was suddenly being portrayed as
an asylum crisis.” 61 It was with these social and political undertones that
Congress crafted and enacted one of the largest overhauls of immigration law in
U.S. history: the IIRIRA.62
B. IIRIRA’s Amendments to the INA and DHS’s Response
Given its constituents’ concerns, it is unsurprising that Congress’s primary
goals in enacting IIRIRA were to reduce illegal immigration and curb the
perceived abuse of the asylum process. 63 To meet these goals, Congress
simultaneously (1) created the expedited removal process, (2) revamped the
existing reinstatement of removal process, and (3) amended the asylum
provision. These revisions are examined below, as is (4) the withholding-only
regulation promulgated shortly after the enactment of IIRIRA.
1. The Expedited Removal Provision
Congress’s goals of reducing illegal immigration and the abuse of asylum,
while still protecting bona fide asylum seekers, are both apparent in the
expedited removal provision. This provision provides that noncitizens who seek
entry without valid documents or were apprehended within 100 miles of the
border within two weeks of entering without inspection are removed virtually
on the spot, without ever appearing before an immigration judge, pursuant to a
final, unreviewable removal order issued by a CBP officer.64
But, to prevent the expedited removal of bona fide asylum seekers, Congress
included a critical detail in the expedited removal statutory provision: if a
noncitizen flagged for expedited removal “indicates either an intention to apply
for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution, the officer shall refer the [noncitizen] for

59. Mydans, supra note 36; see also SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 53 n.114; Carrol, supra note
34 (discussing data showing that more than 65% of Americans polled between June and July 1993
favored a decrease in immigration).
60. Mydans, supra note 36.
61. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 45, 53.
62. See, e.g., Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 423 (2009) (observing that the IIRIRA
“substantially amended” the INA); Marogi v. Jenifer, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1059 n.3 (E.D. Mich.
2000) (“IIRIRA . . . was Congress’s latest major overhaul of the immigration laws.”); James E.
Crowe, III, Comment, Running Afoul of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Expedited Removal
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 291, 291 n.3 (1999) (noting that “[t]he last comprehensive overhaul of the [INA] is considered
to have been the Immigration Act of 1952”).
63. See, e.g., In re C-W-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 346, 349 (B.I.A. 2007) (“[The IIRIRA] was
intended, in part, to curb abuse of the asylum process and other parts of removal proceedings.”).
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2012).
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an interview by an asylum officer.”65 To elicit a noncitizen’s indications of fear
or an intent to apply for asylum, Congress instructed CBP officers to interview
noncitizens in expedited removal proceedings.66 DHS policies mandate that this
interview entail reading a script that not only explains the purpose of the
interview, but also asks the noncitizen four questions, three of which are clearly
designed to elicit expressions of fear.67 If the noncitizen expresses a fear during
the course of this interview, the CBP officer is instructed to refer that noncitizen
to a “credible fear” interview with an asylum officer.68 If the asylum officer
then finds the noncitizen has a credible fear, the asylum claim is then heard by
an immigration judge, who, like under pre-IIRIRA procedures, determines
whether the noncitizen has a well-founded fear of persecution and is a refugee.69
In sum, Congress set the bar for providing referrals extremely low—to a mere
“indication” of fear or intent to seek asylum, rather than requiring a literal
expression of fear and certainly not a fear based on a protected ground—while
also explicitly placing the responsibility of assessing the merits of asylum claims
in the hands of a trained asylum officer and immigration judge, not low level
CBP officers.70 Congress designed this process in an effort to “protect those
aliens who present credible claims for asylum by giving them an opportunity for
a full hearing on their claims,” that is “the same as any other alien in the U.S.”71

65. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
66. Id. (providing that officers must screen noncitizens flagged for expedited removal).
67. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2016). The noncitizens are asked the following questions:
[1] Why did you leave your home country or country of last residence?
[2] Do you have any fear or concern about being returned to your home
country or being removed from the United States?
[3] Would you be harmed if you are returned to your home country or country
of last residence?
[4] Do you have any questions or is there anything else you would like to add?
Kuck, supra note 25, at 253 app. A (providing sample Form I-867B: “Record Sworn Statement in
Proceedings Under Section 235(b)(1) of the Act”).
68. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). A noncitizen has a “credible fear” of persecution if they
can show a “significant possibility” of establishing eligibility for asylum. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v)
(defining “credible fear of persecution” as “a significant possibility, taking into account the
credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts
as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum”).
69. Noncitizens who are not eligible for expedited removal are placed in formal removal
proceedings and may raise asylum claims before an immigration judge in an adversarial proceeding.
See Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states (last
updated Oct. 19, 2015).
70. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 16–17 (1996).
71. Id. at 12–13 (“Throughout the process, the procedures protect those aliens who present
credible claims for asylum by giving them an opportunity for a full hearing on their claims.”); id.
at 158 (“If the alien meets this [credible fear] threshold, the alien is permitted to remain in the U.S.
to receive a full adjudication of the asylum claim—the same as any other alien in the U.S.”); see
also id. at 107–08 (“[A]rriving aliens with credible asylum claims will be allowed to pursue those
claims.”).
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Based on these procedural safeguards, Congress was confident that “there
should be no danger that an alien with a genuine asylum claim will be returned
to persecution.”72
2. The Reinstatement of Removal and Withholding of Removal Provisions
Prior to IIRIRA, the reinstatement statutory provision applied only to certain
illegal reentrants—those who were deemed “anarchists” or “subversives”—but
even those individuals could still seek some discretionary relief. 73 Notably,
however, in the thirty years prior to 1996, this provision was rarely invoked,
with its last mention in a reported Board of Immigration Appeals decision
occurring in 1966.74
Congress resurrected this dormant provision in 1996 with IIRIRA.75 Now the
reinstatement provision applies to all illegal reentrants, it explicitly insulates
reinstated removal orders from judicial review, and it bars the noncitizen from
applying for or receiving “any relief” under the INA.76 Thus, much like the
expedited removal process, the reinstatement provision streamlines the process
of removing noncitizens who have already been deemed removable and are
again unlawfully present.
While Congress significantly modified the reinstatement provision when
enacting IIRIRA, it did not substantively alter the withholding of removal
provision, which it recodified a few subsections below the reinstatement
provision. 77 As previously noted, withholding of removal instructs that
noncitizens may not be removed if their life or freedom will be threatened on
account of a protected ground, subject to limited exceptions.78 This language
72. Id. at 158 (“Under this [expedited removal] system, there should be no danger that an
alien with a genuine asylum claim will be returned to persecution.”).
73. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 33–34 (2006).
74. Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that this provision
had largely “fallen into desuetude,” and citing Matter of Ibarra-Obando, 12 I. & N. Dec. 576
(B.I.A. 1966) as the last time a published BIA opinion had considered it).
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (1994), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (Supp. II 1996) provides:
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after
having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior
order of removal is reinstated . . . and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the
alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the alien shall
be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.
76. Id. Congress did not define “relief” in the INA; see also Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794
F.3d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2015) (“The immigration statutes do not define the word ‘relief’”).
77. The only revision IIRIRA made to the withholding of removal provision from its original
form was to add an explanatory paragraph regarding two of the existing exceptions to eligibility.
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1980) with 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3) (Supp. II 1996).
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012) states:
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney General may not remove an alien
to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be
threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.
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mirrors the international law principle of “nonrefoulement,” a principle the U.S.
is obligated to uphold as a signatory to the United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees.79 Thus, withholding of removal is the final safeguard
against nonrefoulement when no other form of relief, such as asylum, is
available. To determine if a noncitizen is eligible for withholding of removal,
Congress instructed the Attorney General to apply the asylum interviewing
process as outlined in the asylum statutory provision—that is, an immigration
judge must ultimately evaluate the merits of the withholding of removal claim.80
3. The Asylum Provision
Prior to 1980, U.S. law did not address refugees or asylum seekers. In 1980,
however, Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, an amendment to the INA
that opened the nation’s doors to asylum seekers for the first time.81 In enacting
the Refugee Act of 1980, “one of Congress’[s] primary purposes was to bring
United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”82
Beginning with the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress has always distinguished
between which noncitizens could apply for asylum, and those who, although
they could apply, were nevertheless ineligible for it. Specifically, beginning
with the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress placed no limitations on who could
apply for asylum, but instead, simply instructed the Attorney General to
“establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a

Id.
79. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999) (“The basic withholding [of the
removal] provision [codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1231(b)(3)] . . . parallels Article 33 [of the Refugee
Convention], which provides that ‘no Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of [a protected ground].’”) (quoting Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees art. 33(1), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150)). The Aguirre-Aguirre court
also noted that nearly all the provisions of this Convention, including Article 33, were incorporated
by reference in the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which the U.S. acceded to in
1968. Id.
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (2012) (“In determining whether an alien has demonstrated that
the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened for a reason described in subparagraph (A), the trier
of fact shall determine whether the alien has sustained the alien’s burden of proof, and shall make
credibility determinations, in the manner described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of section 1158(b)(1)(B)
of this title.”).
81. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. IV 1980)); see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 433 (1987) (“Prior
to the 1980 amendments there was no statutory basis for granting asylum to aliens who applied
from within the United States.”). Previously, “asylum for aliens who were within the United States
had been governed by regulations promulgated by the INS, pursuant to the Attorney General’s
broad parole authority.” Id. at 427 n.4.
82. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436.
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land border or port of entry, irrespective of such [noncitizen’s] status, to apply
for asylum.”83
Regarding which applicants were eligible for asylum, Congress provided that
the Attorney General may grant asylum to applicants who meet the definition of
“refugee.”84 In the definition of refugee, Congress placed one categorical bar to
asylum eligibility: noncitizens who in any way “participated in the persecution
of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion” are not “refugees,” and therefore,
although they may apply for asylum, they would nevertheless be ineligible to
receive it.85
In 1990, Congress created the first bar on who could apply for asylum:
noncitizens with aggravated felony convictions “may not apply for or be granted
asylum.”86 From 1980 to 1996, the only other amendment Congress made to the
asylum statute was in 1994, when Congress limited asylum seekers’ access to
work authorization while their asylum applications were pending.87
In 1996, Congress passed IIRIRA, which included significant structural and
substantive changes to the asylum statutory provision. To begin with, Congress
redrafted sections 1158(a), “Authority to Apply for Asylum,” and 1158(b),
“Conditions for Granting Asylum.” These structural changes reiterated
Congress’s long-standing delineation between (a) those who could apply for
asylum and, of those applicants, (b) the guidelines for asylum eligibility.88
Turning first to who could apply for asylum, Congress divided § 1158(a) into
two parts. Subpart (1) is a general rule stating that “any alien . . . irrespective of
such alien’s status” may apply for asylum in accordance with the asylum
provision (§ 1158) and the expedited removal provision (§ 1225(b)).89 Notably,
Congress’s reference to “any” noncitizen appears to be expansive when

83. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
84. Id. at § 1158(b). A “refugee” is:
any person . . .who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, [his home] country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
86. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 515, 104 Stat. 5053 (1990) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) (Supp. II 1990)) (“An alien who has been convicted of an aggravated
felony . . . may not apply for or be granted asylum.”). Previously, there were no bars to who could
apply for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(e) (1994). Previously, asylum seekers received work authorization
automatically upon applying for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1522(b)–(c) (Supp. IV 1980) (repealed 1994).
88. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994), with Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 604, 110 Stat. 3009-690 (1996) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. III 1997)).
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2012).
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considering that prior versions of the asylum statute contemplated asylum for
merely “an alien.”90
The second part is Subpart (2), titled “Exceptions”; which lists three newlylegislated exceptions to the Subpart (1)’s general rule that “any” noncitizen may
apply for asylum.91 These exceptions amount to mandatory grounds for denial
due to ineligibility and apply when the noncitizen: (A) could be removed to a
safe third country; (B) failed to apply for asylum within a year of arriving in the
U.S.; or (C) was previously denied asylum.92 However, Congress also created
one exception to the second and third ineligibility grounds: (D) if a noncitizen
establishes changed or extraordinary circumstances, he or she may apply for
asylum at any time, even after the one-year deadline has passed or after an initial
asylum application is denied.93 While adding these bars to asylum access and
the changed circumstances exceptions, Congress simultaneously discarded the
only pre-IIRIRA bar to who could apply for asylum—the aggravated felony
bar.94
Turning to the eligibility for asylum provision, § 1158(b), Congress divided it
into four parts—three of which are relevant here. Subsection (b)(1) is the same
general rule as in prior versions of the INA; it gives the Attorney General the
authority to grant asylum when an applicant is a “refugee” by definition. 95
Subsection (b)(2) lays out the exceptions to this general rule and bars the
following noncitizens from asylum eligibility: noncitizens who participated in
the persecution of another based on the protected asylum grounds; were
convicted of a particularly serious crime, which includes aggravated felonies;
probably committed a serious political crime outside the U.S. or are a danger to
the security of the U.S.; committed terrorist activities;96 or “firmly resettled in
another country” prior to arriving in the U.S.97 Subsection (b)(2)(C) provides
that the Attorney General may create regulations that establish “additional
limitations and conditions, consistent with this section, under which [a

90. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994) with 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2012).
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A)–(D) (2012).
92. Id.
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) states:
An application for asylum of an alien may be considered, notwithstanding subparagraphs
(B) [one-year deadline] and (C) [previous asylum application], if the alien demonstrates
to the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the existence of changed circumstances
which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary
circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application within the period specified in
subparagraph (B) [one-year deadline].
94. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996) with Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-649, § 515(a)(1), 104 Stat. 5053 (1990) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)
(1990)).
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (Supp. II 1996).
96. Id. This is the only instance in the asylum statute where Congress incorporated by crossreference an existing ground of removability as a bar to asylum eligibility.
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2012).
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noncitizen] shall be ineligible for asylum under [§ 1158(a)(1)]”; that is, who may
apply but nevertheless may be found ineligible for relief.98
A final relevant revision IIRIRA made to the asylum statute was the addition
of § 1158(d)(5)(B): “The Attorney General may provide by regulation for any
other conditions or limitation on the consideration of an application for asylum
not inconsistent with this chapter.”99 When compared to prior versions of the
asylum provision, this is restrictive language. Previously, Congress placed no
restriction on the Attorney General’s regulatory authority, and instead, broadly
instructed the Attorney General to “establish a procedure” for noncitizens to
apply for asylum.100
In sum, these revisions all furthered Congress’s goal to reduce the perceived
abuse of the asylum system, while still maintaining the long-held American ideal
that America’s doors should never be shut in the face of bona fide refugees. The
new restrictions on who could be eligible for asylum would, at least in theory,
weed out bogus applicants, and even these new restrictions were not absolute,
since Congress recognized that bona fide applicants may have good reason for
applying late or even reapplying. Congress also seemingly broadened who could
seek asylum by not only ensuring asylum access to “any” noncitizen, but also
by restricting for the first time what type of regulations the Attorney General
could promulgate regarding who may apply for asylum.
4. The Withholding-Only Regulation
Although Congress expressly addressed the interplay between the asylum and
the expedited removal provisions, both by cross-reference and by explicitly
instructing immigration officers to screen noncitizens flagged for expedited
removal to determine whether they have indicated a fear of persecution or an
intent to apply for asylum, Congress made no such cross-references or mention
relating to the reinstatement provision and the asylum and withholding
provisions.
But rather than giving these three statutory provisions full effect, the DHS
interpreted the reinstatement provision’s bar on “any relief” as trumping the
asylum provision’s grant of asylum access to “any” noncitizen, subject to the
three exceptions enumerated in the asylum provision. 101 The DHS further
interprets the withholding of removal provision’s prohibition on removing
98. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
99. Id. § 1158(d)(5)(B).
100. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994) (repealed 1996) (“The Attorney General shall establish a
procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry,
irrespective of such alien’s status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the
discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee
within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42) (A) of this title.”).
101. Questions and Answers: Reasonable Fear Screenings, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questions-answers-reason a
ble-fear-screenings (last updated June 18, 2013).
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noncitizens who may be persecuted in their home country as the only protection
available under the INA to a noncitizen fearing removal.102
Pursuant to this interpretation, the DHS promulgated regulations mandating
that noncitizens with reinstated removal orders who fear persecution may apply
for withholding of removal only.103 This regulatory scheme further provides
that when CBP believes a noncitizen has illegally entered the U.S., CBP must
interview the noncitizen to determine their identity and whether they illegally
reentered after having been removed or voluntarily departed pursuant to a prior
removal order.104 If so, CBP will automatically reinstate the removal order, and
“[t]he alien has no right to a hearing before an immigration judge in such
circumstances.”105
But, unlike the expedited removal statutory provision and regulation, both of
which require CBP to issue a referral when the noncitizen merely “indicates” a
fear of persecution, in reinstatement proceedings, the regulation requires the
noncitizen to actually “express a fear of persecution”—a more stringent
requirement—to receive a “reasonable fear” referral. 106 Additionally, CBP
officers must ask a single, unexplained fear-based question during the
reinstatement interview, compared to the interview and rights explanation and
the three fear-based questions mandated in the expedited removal context.107
This one question is mandated only by CBP internal policies, rather than by
statute or regulation.108 And because CBP has not made its current internal
policies public, it is unclear whether this single question remains part of the
CBP’s interview requirements.109
102. Id.
103. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e) (2016) (providing that noncitizens who express a fear of removal
during the reinstatement of their prior order of removal should be referred to an asylum officer to
determine whether the noncitizen has a “reasonable fear” of persecution or torture); see also id. §
1208.31 (providing how adjudicators are to process “reasonable fear” claims made during
reinstatement of removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5)).
104. Id. § 241.8(a)(1)–(3).
105. See id.; see also Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that
under the former regulation, the noncitizen had the right to appeal an adverse decision to the Board
of Immigration Appeals and ultimately to the federal courts of appeal).
106. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e).
107. See Memorandum from John P. Torres, Acting Dir. of the Office of Det. and Removal
Operations, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t to Field Office Dirs., § 14.8(b)(2) (Mar. 27, 2006),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos/09684drofieldpolicymanual.pdf
(updating
CBP’s 2006 Instructor’s Field Manual with instructions on reinstatement of removal proceedings,
including the requirement that interviewing CBP officers ask the noncitizen, “[d]o you have any
fear of persecution or torture should you be removed from the United States?”).
108. See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (Supp. II 1996); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e).
109. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNSEL, CBP RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL 1
n.4 (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/foia_documen
ts/access_to_counsel_cbp_foia_factsheet.pdf (stating “the Inspector’s Field Manual (IFM) . . . has
been replaced by the electronic Officer Reference Tool (ORT). Since the ORT is not publicly
available, it is unclear what guidance is currently in use. CBP’s Office of Field Operations has
recognized that CBP officers are still using the IFM as a ‘reference,’ but stated that the officers
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Ultimately, if CBP officers ask this question and the noncitizen answers
affirmatively, the regulation requires CBP to refer them to a “reasonable fear”
interview, the first step in applying for withholding of removal, rather than a
“credible fear” interview, the standard for asylum.110 If, however, the noncitizen
does not express a fear of persecution, the noncitizen is immediately removed
pursuant to an unreviewable reinstated removal order.111
C. The Outcome: The Statutory and Regulatory Scheme in Practice
Based on the withholding-only regulation, “countless” noncitizens have fled
persecution and have been denied the opportunity to apply for asylum in the U.S.
based solely on their reinstated removal order.112 This includes individuals who
were errantly removed through the expedited removal process because the
interviewing CBP officer did not inquire about the noncitizen’s fear of
persecution prior to entering the removal order. One such person is Yesenia,
who, like Emely, is gay; and after being forced to marry a sixty-four-year-old
man who drugged, raped, and impregnated her as a “cure” for her sexual
orientation when she was only fourteen years old, she fled El Salvador.113 When
she arrived in the U.S., CBP placed her in expedited removal proceedings and,
without ever asking about her fear of removal, quickly deported her.114 When
she fled to the U.S. a second time, her prior removal order was reinstated, but
before deporting her, the CBP officer asked about her fear of removal; she
responded by expressing her fears and as a result, she was then placed in
withholding-only proceedings. 115 Yesenia appealed her placement in
withholding-only proceedings all the way to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing she had the right to apply for asylum under the INA; however, prior to
the Ninth Circuit’s consideration of this argument, the DHS agreed to allow
Yesenia to apply for asylum, thereby settling the appeal in February 2014.116

should be using ‘current guidance and policy issued by HQ.’”). Notably, Emely’s A-file states that
she was asked this fear-based question and answered “no.” However, she claims she was never
asked about her fear of persecution. See supra note 1.
110. Compare, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e) (mandating that in reinstatement of removal screening,
noncitizens expressing a fear of removal are to be referred to an asylum officer for a “reasonable
fear” interview), and id. § 1208.31(a) (same), with id. § 235.3(b)(4) (establishing procedures for
referrals to “credible fear” interviews), and id. § 208.30 (same), and id. § 1208.30 (same).
111. Id. § 241.8(a).
112. See Brief for American Immigration Lawyers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 2, Perez-Guzman v. Holder, No. 13-70579 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2014) [hereinafter AILA
Amicus Brief] (“Amici are aware of countless individuals facing the same problem.”).
113. Brief for Center for Gender & Refugee Studies et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 11–13, Maldonado Lopez v. Holder, No. 12-72800 (9th Cir. June 6, 2013).
114. Id. at 3.
115. See id. at 24 n.20.
116. Id. at 3; see also Order of Dismissal, Maldonado Lopez v. Holder, No. 12-72800 (9th Cir.
Feb. 4, 2014), EFC No. 41 (granting parties’ joint motion to dismiss petition for review).
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Like Emely and Yesenia, Rony Guzman fled to the U.S. twice, fearing for his
life after he was targeted for death for testifying against a gang member in
Guatemala, in addition to being kidnapped and beaten by the police.117 Yet CBP
errantly removed him through an expedited removal order without inquiring
about his fear of persecution. When he returned, CBP reinstated his prior order,
but this time also referred him to a reasonable fear interview based on his
expression of fear. 118 Like Yesenia, Rony appealed his placement in
withholding-only proceedings to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the withholdingonly regulation conflicts with the INA.119 The Ninth Circuit recently issued a
decision in his case that created a circuit split with the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ 2015 decision—the only other opinion on this issue. 120 These
decisions are discussed below in Part II.
The withholding-only regulation also bars noncitizens from applying for
asylum even when the persecution they endured occurred after their initial
removal from the U.S. 121 “Mirabel’s” is one such case. In 2001, she was
removed from the U.S. to Honduras, and “subsequently became romantically
involved with an abusive man,” who “confined her to her home, raped her
[repeatedly], and even allowed his friends to gang rape her.”122 When she fled
to the U.S., Mirabel’s prior order of removal was reinstated, barring her from
applying for asylum based on these events, all of which occurred after her 2001
order of removal was entered.123
Like Mirabel, the persecution compelling “David,” who is transgender, to flee
Honduras occurred after the DHS removed her from the U.S. 124 She
subsequently fled the violence against sexual minorities in Honduras; however,
CBP deported her again without inquiring about her fear of persecution, this time
pursuant to a reinstated removal order. 125 After her second deportation to
Honduras, “she was shot in the face for being transgender and lost an eye.”126
She then fled to the U.S. for the second time (her third entry), and was placed in
withholding-only proceedings based on her expression of fear, unable to apply
for asylum based on a removal order that occurred prior to her persecution.127

117. AILA Amicus Brief, supra note 112, at 1.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2.
120. See Perez-Guzman v. Holder, 835 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g denied, No. 1370579 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2017), EFC No. 130 (pending petition for a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court); Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2015).
121. AILA Amicus Brief, supra note 112, at 2–3.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 3–4.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 4.
127. Id.
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Furthermore, immigration advocates have reported that CBP reinstates
removal orders when the noncitizen merely seeks entry without valid travel
documents, rather than when the noncitizen illegally reenters, the only
circumstance that by statute should trigger the reinstatement provision.128 Thus,
the withholding-only provision creates a vicious reinstatement-of-removal cycle
that puts noncitizens fleeing persecution seriously at risk of being harmed or
killed.129
The familiar Chevron framework governs the analysis of whether this
withholding-only regulatory scheme is valid; this analysis, along with the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits’ recent interpretations of the INA on this issue, is explored
below.
II. PUTTING THE WITHHOLDING-ONLY REGULATORY SCHEME TO THE
CHEVRON TEST
Under the Supreme Court’s familiar holding in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the validity of an agency’s regulation
is governed by a two-step inquiry.130 Under Chevron step one, the reviewing
court asks whether Congress has clearly and unambiguously spoken to the
question at issue.131 If it has, the court then determines whether the regulation
comports with Congress’s clear intent.132 If, however, the court determines the
statute is silent or ambiguous regarding the specific question at issue, the
reviewing court moves to Chevron step two and asks whether the regulation is
based on a permissible, reasonable interpretation of the statute; an agency’s
unreasonable, manifestly unjust interpretations will not stand. 133 Here, the
withholding-only regulatory scheme fails under both Chevron inquiries.134
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012).
129. See Sibylla Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington, U.S. Government Deporting Central American
Migrants to Their Deaths, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015, 8:57 AM), https://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/2015/oct/12/obama-immigration-deportations-central-america (reporting, “The U.S.
government is deporting undocumented immigrants back to Central America to face the imminent
threat of violence, with several individuals being murdered just days or months after their return . .
. ,” and as many as eighty-three people killed after their deportation since 2014); see also Brad
Wong, Domestic Violence Survivor Killed by Ex-Boyfriend After Deportation to Mexico, Lawsuit
Says, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2013/06/25/domestic-violence-deportation_n_3499117.html (reporting that according to court
documents, CBP forcibly removed Laura, a twenty-two-year-old mother of three, over her tearful
pleas for refuge in the U.S. from her violent former boyfriend. Five days after her removal, “her
former boyfriend abducted her and took her to a hotel . . . . Later, her body was found in a burning
car.”).
130. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Only federal appellate courts have jurisdiction to review agency regulations. See Matter
of Akram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 874, 880 (B.I.A. 2012) (finding the immigration judge and BIA are
bound to agency regulations). Federal appellate courts review issues of statutory interpretation and
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A. Has Congress Clearly and Unambiguously Spoken to Who May Not Apply
for Asylum?
To determine whether Congress has clearly and unambiguously spoken to
who cannot apply for asylum, a court must analyze the plain and ordinary
meaning of the statutory language, read in the context of the overall statutory
structure, subject matter, historic context, and legislative history—all of which
“help courts determine a statute’s objective and thereby illuminate its text.”135
Courts also employ traditional canons of statutory interpretation as guides.136
1. Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit addressed this issue—an issue of first impression
among all circuits at the time—in Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch.137 There, the court
found that Congress had spoken to the question at issue in the INA,138 and held
that the plain language of § 1231(a)(5), the reinstatement-of-removal provision,
bars noncitizens with reinstated orders from “all relief from removal, even
asylum” under § 1158, the asylum provision.139 In reaching this holding, the
court’s analysis focused on two words in the reinstatement provision: “any” and
“relief.”140
Regarding “relief,” the court found that Congress did not define this term in
any immigration law, including in the INA; consequently, the court looked to
Black’s Law Dictionary, which generally defines “relief” as “encompass[ing]
any ‘redress or benefit’ provided by a court.”141 The court also noted that courts
commonly use the phrase “asylum relief,” compared to withholding of removal
“protection.”142 Based on this analysis, the court found that asylum is a form of

construction de novo. Padash v. INS, 358 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We review questions
of law regarding the INA de novo.”); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“We review de novo . . . the BIA’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
135. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1998).
136. See id. at 228 (explaining that to determine Congressional intent, courts “look to the
statute’s language, structure, subject matter, context, and history—factors that typically help courts
determine a statute’s objectives and thereby illuminate its text” (citing United States v. Wells, 519
U.S. 482, 490 (1997) (applying the “interpretive hierarchy” of statutory canons in order to
determine congressional intent))); see also Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of
Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 343 (2010) (explaining that “‘canons of construction’ (also known
as maxims of interpretation) guide the methods and sources used in statutory interpretation . . . .”).
137. 794 F.3d 485, 490–91 (5th Cir. 2015).
138. Although the petitioner in Ramirez-Mejia attacked the validity of the withholding-only
regulation, the court did not conduct Chevron analysis. Instead, the Ramirez-Mejia court held that
the statutory scheme alone established the reinstatement bar to asylum, and found the Agency’s
withholding-only regulation supported that holding. Id. at 48–91.
139. Id. at 90.
140. Id. at 489–90.
141. Id. at 489.
142. Id.
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“relief” within the meaning of § 1231(a)(5), but that withholding of removal is
not.143
Regarding the meaning of “any” relief, the court noted that “[r]ead naturally,
the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning,” and “[w]hen the word is not qualified
by restrictive language, there is no basis in the text for limiting the word or clause
it modifies.” 144 The court also found that a contrary interpretation—one
allowing noncitizens with reinstated removal orders to apply for asylum—would
be inconsistent with the reinstatement provision.145 In support of this finding,
the court reasoned that “Congress has many options in revising statutory
schemes,” and “[a]dopting a clear limitation in one section [§ 1231(a)(5)’s
reinstatement provision] without amending another section [§ 1158’s asylum
provision] specifically dealing with the same subject is one such option.”146 Put
differently, the court found that the general provision (the reinstatement
provision) trumped the specific provision (the asylum provision). As a result,
the court held that “[t]he clear language in Section 1231(a)(5) suffices to bar all
relief from removal, even asylum.”147
At each level, the court’s analysis contained flaws, but the root problem was
the court’s failure to apply traditional canons of statutory construction, which
resulted in an opinion that sets bad precedent. Before addressing the flaws in its
resolution of the interplay between the asylum and reinstatement provisions, a
143. Id. at 489–90.
144. Id. at 490 (citations omitted).
145. Id.
146. Id. The court’s understanding of the legislative history of these provisions is misguided;
as addressed in Part I, Congress amended both sections simultaneously. This factual
misunderstanding seriously undermines the court’s statutory interpretation, in addition to the fact
that the court ignored well-established canons of statutory interpretation, such as the
general/specific rule. See, e.g., RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Band, 132 S. Ct.
2065, 2070–72 (2012).
147. Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 490. The court further reasoned that analogous case law
supported this conclusion, citing two cases holding that noncitizens with reinstated removal orders
are not eligible for adjustment of status, a form of “relief.” Id. at 490–91. Notably, however, the
regulation’s validity was not challenged in either of those cases, and therefore in reaching these
holdings, these courts considered both the regulation and the statute in determining that the
petitioners were not eligible for adjustment of status relief. Compare id. at 490 (“The clear
language in Section 1231(a)(5) suffices to bar all relief from removal, even asylum.”), with
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 35–36 n.4 (2006) (discussing the regulations that may
be considered when an alien seeks withholding of removal, “[n]otwithstanding the absolute terms
in which the bar on relief is stated”), and Silva Rosa v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 403, 406 (5th Cir. 2007)
(finding that the statutory language was unclear as to the “statutes proper reach”). Ramirez-Mejia,
conversely, stands for the proposition that the plain language of the INA alone bars asylum relief.
Interestingly, the DHS’s application of the withholding-only regulation actually undermines this
plain-language holding. As cases like Yesenia’s illustrate, the Attorney General has exercised
discretion in applying the § 1231(a)(5) reinstatement bar, and allowed a noncitizen to apply for
asylum despite having a reinstated removal order. Thus, the Agency may not have promulgated
the withholding-only regulation due to the plain language of the INA, as the Ramirez-Mejia court
concluded, and if the Agency did, it has since departed from that interpretation of the INA.
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few preliminary points regarding the court’s analysis of “relief” are worth
mentioning, as they further illustrate why the application of interpretive canons
is vital to establishing good precedent.
First, there is no doubt that a court’s ultimate goal when conducting statutory
analysis is to determine congressional intent.148 Therefore, when the RamirezMejia court correctly found that Congress did not define “relief,” the court
should have next considered how Congress used “relief” in the INA before
considering secondary sources like the dictionary or colloquial usage.149 Had
the Ramirez-Mejia court applied this “normal rule of statutory construction”—
that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have
the same meaning”150—it would have found that Congress explicitly refers to
asylum and withholding of removal as forms of “relief” in several sections in
the INA.151 This alone undermines the court’s holding, since it looked to the
dictionary and colloquialisms, rather than Congressional usage, to find that
“relief” included asylum, but not withholding of removal.152
Another well-established canon of statutory interpretation succinctly captures
the court’s other error: “It is a commonplace of statutory construction that the
specific governs the general.”153 Under this canon, the “general language of a
148. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984) (“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”).
149. Canons of interpretation provide that the dictionary's definition or the colloquial uses of
a word may be indicators of what Congress intended when it used a particular word; however, those
canons are less preferred in this case, where Congress itself used the word “relief” repeatedly in the
INA, and therefore deducing its meaning based on these uses is more appropriate when determining
congressional intent. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 491 (1997) (“[Courts] do, of
course, presume that Congress incorporates the common-law meaning of the terms it uses if those
terms have accumulated settled meaning under the common law,” but this canon of interpretation
is appropriately employed only when “the statute does not otherwise dictate.”); see also Scott, supra
note 136, at 343.
150. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 486 (1990).
151. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (“There is no time limit on the filing of a motion
to reopen if the basis of the motion is to apply for relief under sections 1158 [asylum] or 1231(b)(3)
[withholding of removal] of this title. . . .” (footnote omitted)). Moreover, as a general rule,
Congress uses the term “relief” in the INA to reference mandatory benefits, such as withholding of
removal, see id. § 1229a(c)(4)(A), and discretionary benefits, such as cancellation of removal, see
§ 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (cross-referencing § 1229b(a)).
152. See Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 489 (noting that courts commonly refer to asylum as
“asylum relief” and withholding of removal as “forms of protection,” as support for its holding that
Congress intended to bar asylum relief, but not withholding protection (emphasis added)).
However, this conclusion and reasoning ignores conflicting precedent. See, e.g., INS v. AguirreAguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1999) (referring to asylum and withholding of removal as forms
of “relief”).
153. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2071 (2012)
(quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)).
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statutory provision, although broad enough to include it, will not be held to apply
to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment.”154
“The general/specific canon is perhaps most frequently applied to statutes,” like
the one at issue here, “in which a general permission or prohibition is
contradicted by a specific prohibition or permission.” 155 To eliminate the
contradiction, the Supreme Court instructs that the specific provision should be
construed as “an exception to the general one.” 156 This not only avoids
contradiction, but also “the superfluity of a specific provision that is swallowed
by the general one, ‘violating the cardinal rule that, if possible, effect shall be
given to every clause and part of a statute.’”157
Had the Ramirez-Mejia court applied these and other axiomatic rules of
statutory construction, it would have reached a different result—one that would
allow “any” noncitizen to apply for asylum, even noncitizens whose removal
orders were reinstated. For example, as acknowledged in Ramirez-Mejia, the
“general” provision is § 1231(a)(5), the reinstatement provision; it applies to
noncitizens with reinstated orders of removal, and bars them from applying for
“any relief.” 158 By contrast, the asylum provision, § 1158, “specifically”
addresses who may and may not seek one particular form of “relief”—asylum.159
However, in § 1158’s list of exceptions to its broad grant of who may apply for
asylum—“any alien,” “irrespective of such alien’s status”—Congress neither
cross-referenced nor mentioned the reinstatement bar. 160 Section 1158 also
includes a provision allowing for multiple asylum applications based on changed
country conditions.161 Thus, to resolve the conflict between these provisions,
154. Id. (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)).
155. Id.
156. Id.; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)
(explaining that the canon to resolve ambiguities so as not to conflict with each other, as
incorporated above, is based on the presumption that Congress intended to create “a symmetrical
and coherent regulatory scheme”).
157. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2071 (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v.
Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)).
158. Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Congress has many options in
revising statutory schemes. Adopting a clear limitation in one section [§ 1235(a)(5)] without
amending another section specifically dealing with the same subject [§ 1158] is one such option.”
(emphasis added)).
159. Id.
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)–(b) (2012). This is particularly relevant considering (a) that Congress
crafted the two provisions simultaneously and (b) also while crafting §§ 1231 and 1158, Congress
incorporated by cross-reference terrorism-related grounds for inadmissibility as an exception to
who may be granted asylum. See id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v). Thus, the fact that Congress did not
mention or even incorporate by cross-reference § 1231(a)(5)’s bar on relief, yet it did so with other
grounds, further supports the conclusion that Congress intended § 1158 to be an exception to
§ 1231(a)(5)’s general bar on relief.
161. Id. § 1158(a)(2)(D). This shows that Congress necessarily intended that an applicant,
having previously been denied asylum, and therefore also having previously been subject to a final
order of removal and likely removed pursuant to it, would be permitted to re-apply for asylum. It
follows, therefore, that Congress was cognizant that noncitizens with prior orders of removal would
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courts should construe § 1158 as an exception to § 1231(a)(5) to resolve this
contradiction between § 1231(a)(5)’s general prohibition on who may apply for
“any relief” and § 1158’s rules on who may apply specifically for “asylum.”
This reading of the statute avoids violating the “cardinal rule” of statutory
interpretation. It gives effect to every clause of the INA, including
§ 1158(a)(2)(D), the statutory provision allowing for successive asylum
applications, which contrary interpretations of the statute—like the RamirezMejia court’s and the Agency’s—allow to be swallowed up by § 1231(a)(5).162
Other well-established canons of statutory interpretation lead to the same
interpretation. For example, when Congress expressly legislates exceptions to a
general rule as it did here, canons of interpretation encourage courts to narrowly
construe the exceptions, rather than creating additional exceptions to those
Congress listed in the statute.163 Here, in § 1158(a)(2), titled “Exceptions,”164
Congress expressly legislated three exceptions to § 1158(a)(1)’s general rule
regarding who may apply for asylum, and therefore the Ramirez-Mejia and the
DHS interpretations that the reinstatement of removal provision established a
fourth exception is discouraged.165 Similarly, the ancient expressio unius est
exclusio alterius canon advises that Congress’s express mention of one thing—
here, three exceptions—excludes all others, including the reinstatement of
removal provision.166
Interpreting the asylum provision as an exception to the reinstatement
provision not only resolves the potential conflict created by the two provisions,
but also resolves the conflict the Agency and Ramirez-Mejia court’s
interpretations create with U.S. obligations under international law. Under the
centuries-old “Charming Betsy” canon of statutory interpretation, federal law
“ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
apply for asylum, yet Congress did not incorporate the § 1235(a)(5) reinstatement bar by crossreference or any other method in § 1158.
162. See Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 490–91; but cf. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S.
Ct. at 2071 (“[T]he canon avoids not contradiction but the superfluity of a specific provision that
is swallowed by the general one, violating the cardinal rule that, if possible, effect shall be given to
every clause and part of a statute.”).
163. United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 167 (1991) (“Where Congress explicitly enumerates
certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the
absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” (quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446
U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980))); see also Scott, supra note 136, at 363 (“Interpreters are cautioned to
read [exceptions] narrowly,” and “not to create exceptions in excess of those specified by the
legislature.” (footnote omitted)).
164. “Titles are generally not viewed as part of the statute because in old English practice, the
legislature did not provide them.” Scott, supra note 136, at 363. U.S. legislators, by contrast, do
provide the titles, and therefore “titles are not law, but they are not banished from interpretive
significance.” Id.
165. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
166. See Ventas, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1156, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Where Congress
includes certain exceptions in a statute, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius presumes
that those are the only exceptions Congress intended.”).
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construction remains.” 167 This canon is especially compelling here because
Congress’s express purpose in enacting the Refugee Act of 1980 was to bring
U.S. law into conformance with its obligations under the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol). 168 For example, the
Protocol requires the U.S. to provide documented refugees or asylum seekers
with certain benefits, such as the right to travel internationally.169 But under
U.S. law, noncitizens granted withholding of removal under § 1231(b)(3) are not
permitted to travel abroad, while those granted asylum are. 170 Therefore, a
noncitizen who would otherwise meet the lower burden of establishing they are
a “refugee,” but who is permitted to seek only withholding of removal due solely
to the DHS’s current interpretation of the INA, is effectively denied a protection
that the U.S. is obligated to provide under the Protocol.171 This interpretation is
not only contrary to the guidance of numerous canons of interpretation, but it
also contrary to binding precedent, since an alternative, non-conflicting statutory
construction is available.172
Based on these canons of statutory interpretation, in addition to the
considerations addressed below, the Ramirez-Mejia court should have
concluded that Congress has spoken to the question at issue: subject to only the
three exceptions in the asylum provision, “any” noncitizen may apply for
asylum, including those noncitizens with reinstated removal orders.
2. Perez-Guzman
In 2016, the Ninth Circuit became the second circuit court to address the
interplay between the asylum and reinstatement provisions. 173 Though for
167. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
168. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987) (“If one thing is clear from
the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that
one of Congress’[s] primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance
with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United
States acceded in 1968.” (citation omitted)).
169. Convention for the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 21, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223 (adopting the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which
outlines the protocol for “Travel Documents” in article 28).
170. See 8 C.F.R. § 223.1 (2016) (permitting “refugee travel documents” for only noncitizens
granted asylum or refugee status); id. § 241.7 (providing that any departure after successfully
applying for withholding of removal constitutes “self-removal,” and must therefore apply to
reenter).
171. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the applicant had
failed to meet the lower burden of establishing asylum eligibility and therefore also failed to
establish more stringent standard of withholding eligibility).
172. See, e.g., Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118 (“It has also been observed that an act
of Congress ought never be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral
commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.”).
173. Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g denied, No. 13-70579 (9th
Cir. Apr. 26, 2017), EFC No. 130 (pending petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court).
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different reasons than those of the Ramirez-Mejia court, the Perez-Guzman court
reached the same conclusion: the reinstatement of a removal order bars a
noncitizen from seeking asylum. 174 But as thorough as the Perez-Guzman
court’s opinion is, the court still made significant legal errors that led to an
incorrect conclusion.
Under Chevron step one, the court found that Congress has not directly spoken
to the issue of whether asylum is available to a noncitizen who is subject to a
reinstated removal order. Instead, the court found that the reinstatement and
asylum provisions are “in conflict.”175 Before addressing the court’s Chevron
analysis, it should first be noted that it is unclear whether Chevron even applies
to a statutory conflict. That is, as a split U.S. Supreme Court recently discussed,
it is clear that Chevron applies when the statutory scheme at issue is silent or
creates an ambiguity.176 In those cases, courts often find deference is owed to
the agency “because [courts] presume that Congress intended to assign
responsibility to resolve the [silence or] ambiguity to the agency.”177 But, as
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito recently observed,178 a direct
conflict in a statute is not an “ambiguity” that triggers Chevron: “Direct conflict
is not ambiguity, and the resolution of such a conflict is not statutory
construction but legislative choice. Chevron is not a license for an agency to
repair a statute that does not make sense.”179 Thus, given that the Perez-Guzman
court found these statutory provisions created a direct conflict, not an ambiguity
or silence, the court arguably should not have applied Chevron to begin with.180
Turning to the court’s Chevron analysis, the court applied only one canon of
statutory interpretation, the general-specific canon.181 The court found that both
provisions spoke specifically to two subsets of individuals—asylum seekers and
individuals with reinstated removal orders—but that neither provision
174. Id. at 1082.
175. Id. at 1076. Notably, the court refered to the interplay between the two provisions as
creating both an “ambiguity” and a “conflict,” yet it ultimately concluded that Congress was silent
regarding the ultimate question at issue, whether asylum is available to noncitizens with reinstated
removal orders. Id. at 1077.
176. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2214 (2014) (Roberts, C.J. & Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment) (plurality opinion).
177. Id.
178. See id. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting) (plurality opinion) (quoting Chief Justice Roberts’
concurring opinion).
179. Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (plurality opinion)
(emphasis added) (Justices Kagan, Kennedy, and Ginsburg found the statutory conflict was
Chevron-eligible; the remaining three Justices did not take a position on this issue.).
180. See, e.g., Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Perez-Guzman v. Lynch
at 10–11, No. 13-70579 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2016), EFC No. 101 (arguing that because Chevron
“relies on the premise that Congress intentionally delegated authority to an agency . . . . If statutes
conflict, that means Congress did not delegate, it blundered.” And therefore, “[w]hen faced with a
true statutory conflict between two unambiguous statutes, the Court should not defer to the
agency.”).
181. Perez-Guzman, 835 F.3d at 1075–76.
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contemplated subsets of individuals who met both conditions—noncitizens with
reinstated removal orders seeking asylum.182 Consequently, the court concluded
the general-specific canon “does not help to clearly discern Congress’s intent as
to which section should take precedence here.”183
The court also found the legislative history of the INA did not resolve the
ambiguity created by the two provisions. 184 The court considered the
amendments of the INA, including those enacted through IIRIRA, as essentially
a tie: they “show Congress intended to add more detail to the existing asylum
scheme while simultaneously expanding the scope and consequences of the
reinstatement of an earlier removal order.”185 And after finding neither party
presented legislative materials, the court concluded “the legislative history is
‘silent on the precise issue before us.’”186 Consequently, the court moved to
Chevron step two analysis.187
But had the Perez-Guzman court applied the numerous other canons of
statutory interpretation available to it, its conclusions would have been different.
To begin with, the court was unable to determine whether the asylum provision’s
grant of access to asylum to “any” noncitizen (save the three enumerated
exceptions), generally or specifically addressed noncitizens with reinstated
removal orders seeking asylum. But the application of the expressio unius est
exclusio alterius canon—the express mention of one thing excludes all others—
would have guided the court to find that the asylum provision is the “specific”
provision that should control: the asylum provision expressly mentions three
exceptions to asylum access, and therefore, all other exceptions, including the
reinstatement provision, are excluded.188
Similarly, the court did not apply the Charming Betsy doctrine, which
instructs courts to resolve statutory ambiguity in a way that avoids violating
international law, including our treaty obligations under the Refugee Protocol,
whenever possible.189 But rather than resolving the ambiguity in a way that
preserves the asylum provision, which codifies the U.S.’s obligations under the
Refugee Protocol, the court “adopted an agency interpretation that violates
[those] treaty obligations by penalizing refugees based [solely] on their unlawful
entry or presence,” which the U.S., as a party to the Refugee Protocol, is
182. Id. at 1076.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862
(1984)).
187. Id. at 1077.
188. See Ventas, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1156, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
189. See Brief for Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9–11, PerezGuzman v. Lynch, No. 13-70579 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2016) [hereinafter Legal Scholars Amicus
Brief], EFC No. 102-2. The esteemed legal scholars of this amicus brief are Professor James C.
Hathaway, Professor Deborah Anker, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean Kevin R. Johnson, Professor
Hiroshi Motomura, Professor Karen Musalo, and Professor Victor C. Romero.
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prohibited from doing.190 Had the court applied the Charming Betsy doctrine, it
would have resolved this tension in a way that preserves rather than disrupts this
country’s treaty obligations.
Also, contrary to the court’s conclusion that legislative history was unhelpful
in determining Congress’s intent, IIRIRA’s internal legislative history and the
statutory amendments of the reinstatement and asylum provisions both compel
the conclusion that reinstated removal orders should not categorically bar
asylum access.191 Regarding the amendments to the asylum provision, not only
did Congress reconstruct the statute by clearly distinguishing who could apply
for asylum and who was eligible to receive it, but it also added that “any”
noncitizen, rather than just “a” noncitizen, could apply for asylum, subject to
three exceptions. 192 All three of these exceptions were new, and Congress
simultaneously discarded the only then-existing bar to asylum access, the
aggravated felon bar. Thus, if Congress had intended the reinstatement of
removal order to serve as a fourth exception to asylum access, it would have
listed it here when simultaneously amending both the asylum and reinstatement
provisions. Also notable is that in the asylum provision, Congress crossreferenced several other statutory provisions, including the new expedited
removal provision, yet did not cross-reference the reinstatement provision,
despite simultaneously amending it to include a bar on access to “all relief.”193
The court did not consider these amendments in its analysis.
Also persuasive is the fact that when revising the asylum provision, Congress
contemplated placing a numerical cap on how many noncitizens could receive
asylum per year; however, during this process, legislators lamented that not only
would a cap be contrary to American ideals, but that it would also not solve the
main problem voters wanted Congress to resolve: illegal entry.194 Ultimately, a
numerical cap was never enacted.195 Congress also considered, but declined,
190. Id. at 9.
191. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2005)
(“[W]hen a sponsor or committee [of a bill] expresse[s] an understanding of the bill or the mischiefs
at which it was aimed, federal courts often t[ake] that as probative evidence of the text’s meaning.”).
192. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994), with Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 604, 110 Stat. 3009-690 (1996) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. III 1997)).
193. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012).
194. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 517 (1996) (“The admission of refugees to the United
States is intimately connected to our foreign policy concerns . . . . Legislating a cap on refugee
admissions would send the wrong message to nations that share the responsibility for the world’s
refugees and needlessly jeopardize the international system of protection and resettlement of those
fleeing persecution, torture, and other life threatening situations.” (statement of Rep. Reed)); see
also id. at 526 (“Some argue that dramatic cuts in legal immigration and protection of refugees are
supported by the American people. Unlike this bill[‘s proposed cap on refugee admissions],
however, voters draw a clear distinction between illegal and legal immigration.” (dissenting views
of Reps. Conyers, Jr., Schroeder, Jackson-Lee, Berman, Watt, Lofgren, Nadler, Scott, Frank,
Serrano, and Becerra)).
195. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
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creating a categorical bar on asylum applications not filed immediately because
such a bar would only increase the chances of removing bona fide asylum
seekers who had legitimate reasons for not voicing their fear of removal
immediately.196 Ultimately, Congress enacted a one-year deadline for filing an
asylum application, but even that bar is not absolute if the applicant can show
changed or extraordinary circumstances for filing an application after the
deadline.197
Turning to the legislative history of the reinstatement provision, Congress
certainly intended this new provision to “toe[] a harder line,” particularly on
illegal immigration. 198 Indeed, Congress and its constituents (incorrectly) 199
believed unlawfully present noncitizens were depleting the finite resources
available to Americans, such as jobs, public education, and other public benefits,
and were determined to get this problem under control. 200 Undoubtedly,
reducing illegal immigration was Congress’s primary purpose for crafting the
expedited removal provision, which also served a secondary goal of reducing
the abuse of the asylum process. 201 In light of this, the question the PerezGuzman court was unable to consider—because it apparently had no legislative
materials on the record before it—was: how hard a line did Congress intend to
toe when it enacted the reinstatement provision?
Considering another congressional goal in crafting IIRIRA—Congress’s
commitment to the U.S. policy of welcoming and protecting bona fide asylum
seekers—further assists in interpreting the reinstatement provision and

196. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 230–31 (noting that some Senators “would have denied asylum
summarily to anyone who sought to apply for it more than thirty days after entering the United
States,” but “[i]n the end, the deadline was extended to one year, and exceptions were created not
only for changed conditions in the applicant’s country, but also for other types of ‘changed’
circumstances and for ‘extraordinary’ circumstances.”).
197. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
198. See Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 34 (“In IIRIRA, Congress replaced th[e]
reinstatement provision with one that toed a harder line.”).
199. Maria Santana, 5 Immigration Myths Debunked, CNN MONEY (Nov. 20, 2014, 7:12 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/11/20/news/economy/immigration-myths/ (reporting that contrary to
popular belief, immigrants do pay taxes and Social Security, they are not a drain on the system, nor
are they taking American jobs).
200. 142 CONG. REC. 24,778 (1996) (“In California, our health facilities and our schools have
been flooded with illegal aliens. Our public services are stretched to the breaking point. Tens of
billions of dollars that should be going to benefit our own citizens are being drained away to provide
services and benefits to foreigners who have come here illegally.” (statement of Rep.
Rohrabacher)); see also id. at 24,775 (“As we all know, virtually all [illegal immigrants] are lured
here by the prospect of jobs . . .” (statement of Rep. Beilenson)).
201. See, e.g., id. at 24,777–78 (“One of the things this bill does is to reform the whole process
of asylum . . . . We have had lots of people coming in here claiming that. Most of them who claim
it have no foundation in claim at all. Once they get a foot in the airport or wherever, they make
that claim, they get into the system, many of them are never heard from again.” (statement of Rep.
McCollum)).
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answering that question. 202 This goal to protect asylum seekers was often
discussed during the creation of IIRIRA; for example, Rep. Jackson-Lee
commended the progress IIRIRA made in the protection of asylum seekers,
noting that the U.S. is the leader in providing opportunities for justice, liberty,
and freedom, and as such, “we should never deny the opportunity for those
seeking political refuge and needing social justice and fleeing from religious
persecution. Our doors should never be closed [to them].”203
Given this legislative history, it is difficult to believe that the reinstatement
provision’s “harder line” on illegal entry was intended to categorically bar
anyone with a reinstated order from access to asylum when—at the same time it
enacted the reinstatement provision—Congress repeatedly rejected similar bars
to asylum access, such as the numerical cap on refugees and the requirement that
asylees immediately request asylum upon arrival, and instead enacted numerous
measures intended to protect asylum seekers, including the changed
circumstances exceptions to the one-year bar and prior-asylum-adjudication bar.
Put differently, it is difficult to reconcile that on one hand, Congress made
painstaking efforts to ensure asylum seekers have complete access to asylum in
the asylum and expedited removal provisions, including appellate and
reapplication rights and exceptions to two of the three bars on access to asylum,
while on the other hand, simultaneously imposing a mandatory, categorical bar
to asylum access in the illegal reentry context, even for those who experienced
persecution after their initial order of removal was entered and have therefore
never even had a chance to apply. It is especially difficult to reconcile this when
applying canons of statutory interpretation, particularly the Charming Betsy
doctrine and the rule of lenity, which instructs courts to resolve statutory
ambiguities in immigration law in favor of the noncitizen—not the
government.204
Also notable is the fact that Congress explicitly removed the responsibility of
evaluating fear claims from “low level” CBP officers in the expedited removal
process; Congress placed this responsibility exclusively with asylum officers
202. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 13 (1996) (“Throughout the process, the procedures
protect those aliens who present credible claims for asylum by giving them an opportunity for a
full hearing on their claims.”); id. at 107–08 (“[A]rriving aliens with credible asylum claims will
be allowed to pursue those claims.”); id. at 158 (“If the alien meets this [credible fear] threshold,
the alien is permitted to remain in the U.S. to receive a full adjudication of the asylum claim—the
same as any other alien in the U.S. Under this system, there should be no danger that an alien with
a genuine asylum claim will be returned to persecution.”).
203. 142 CONG. REC. 24,779 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee). Additionally, Rep. Smith,
echoed this sentiment in an article published less than a year after taking part in crafting and
enacting IIRIRA, stating: “No aspect of our immigration policy is more closely tied to the history
and founding principles of our nation than the practice of offering refuge to those suffering political
or religious persecution abroad.” Lamar Smith & Edward R. Grant, Immigration Reform: Seeking
the Right Reasons, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 883, 894 (1997).
204. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (applying the rule of lenity and finding
that “[e]ven if [a statute] lacked clarity on this point, we would be constrained to interpret any
ambiguity in the statute in [the noncitizen’s] favor”).
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and immigration judges.205 Thus, it is extremely unlikely that Congress would
account for no margin of error regarding some officers’ inevitably errant
decisions not to refer a bona fide asylum seeker to a credible fear interview,
which then results in an errant expedited removal order, and then a permanent
bar to asylum access.206
All of these considerations show that the Perez-Guzman and Ramirez-Mejia
courts erred. The sounder conclusion is that Congress has spoken to the question
at issue: subject to only the three exceptions in the asylum provision, “any”
noncitizen may apply for asylum, including those with reinstated removal
orders. Alternatively, courts should conclude the reinstatement provision’s bar
to any “relief” does not include access to asylum.207
B. If the INA is Ambiguous, is the Withholding-Only Regulatory Scheme Based
on a Permissible, Reasonable Interpretation of the Asylum, Reinstatement, and
Withholding Statutory Provisions?
Even if a court finds, as the Perez-Guzman court did, that the INA is silent or
ambiguous regarding whether a noncitizen with a reinstated removal order may
not apply for asylum, the DHS’s interpretation does not deserve deference
because it is unreasoned, unreasonable, and leads to arbitrary, manifestly unjust
results.208 To begin with, the agency has repeatedly maintained that there is no
ambiguity or silence on this issue; instead, it has asserted that Congress
expressly spoke to the issue in the reinstatement provision of the INA. 209
Therefore, Chevron deference to the agency is unwarranted because, as the
agency concedes, its regulatory scheme did not involve reconciling conflicting
policies or statutory provisions, nor was it the result of the agency’s unique
knowledge of implementing immigration laws—the bedrock reasons for
Chevron deference.210
205. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
206. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“[Courts] must
be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a
policy decision of such . . . magnitude to an administrative agency.”).
207. See Legal Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 189, at 16–17.
208. See NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257
(1995) (noting that regulations must be “reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed design”);
Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 120 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he regulation’s effect . . . does not
‘harmonize with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and purpose.’” (quoting Sekula v.
FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 1994))).
209. Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g denied, No. 1370579 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2017), EFC No. 130 (addressing the government’s argument that Congress
spoke unambiguously to the issue in the reinstatement provision).
210. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(explaining that “the principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been consistently
followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved
reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the
given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected
to agency regulations”).
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Deference is also not owed because this regulation is the byproduct of the
agency’s hyper-literal reading of the plain language of only the reinstatement
provision; it does not take into account the asylum provision, which codified the
U.S.’s treaty obligation to offer asylum without regard to the noncitizen’s status.
This is not reasoned decision-making that warrants Chevron deference.211
Moreover, “[i]t is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because [it is] not within its spirit[,] nor
within the intention of its makers.”212 And as addressed above, not only does
the withholding-only regulation not contemplate the spirit of the law or
Congress’s clear intent to protect all bona fide asylum seekers, the regulatory
scheme actually conflicts with both. It also creates discord with U.S. obligations
under international law, and is contrary to the interpretation demanded by
numerous canons of statutory construction.
Furthermore, the stories of Emely, Yesenia, Mirabel, David, Rony, and
countless others illustrate that the regulation leads to absurd, manifestly unjust
results, and is therefore owed no deference.213 Specifically, Emely, Yesenia,
and Rony were never given a chance to apply for asylum; they were errantly
removed through the expedited-removal process—none of them were asked
about their fear of persecution prior to being deported, despite statutory and
regulatory rules mandating this inquiry—and when they returned, these
wrongly-entered removal orders were reinstated, placing asylum protection just
out of their reach. Given that Congress made considerable efforts to ensure
asylum access to those in expedited removal, the regulation, coupled with CBP
officers’ refusal to comply with the INA, undermines this congressional intent.
These individuals’ stories also show that the results of the withholding-only
regulation serve no larger policy goal or reasoned consideration. 214 As the
Supreme Court has found, withholding and asylum serve similar purposes, so
allowing illegal reentrants access to withholding relief but not asylum is

211. See Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (reversing
an agency rule because it was not the result of a “reasoned decisionmaking process calculated to
accommodate the conflicting policies”).
212. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
213. Id. at 459 (“If a literal construction of the words of a statute [lead to an absurd result], the
act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity.”).
214. See Gila River Indian Cmty. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that deference to an agency’s interpretation is unwarranted where the agency
interpretation was not “a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make”). Rather, Congress’s
goal of deterring illegal entry and reentry through summary exclusion methods is directed toward
inadmissible noncitizens, not bona fide asylum seekers. See also Martin, supra note 8, at 687
(noting the policy goals of summary removal methods, such as expedited removal and reinstatement
of removal, include deterrence, and also “prevents inadmissible aliens from establishing homes,
employment, and other ties to this country. This enforcement strategy also makes it easier for the
individuals [summarily removed] to resume their lives in their countries of origin.”).
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irreconcilable as a policy goal, as is punishing refugees for illegally reentering
after being errantly removed in the first place.215
Cases like Mirabel’s further illustrate the manifestly unjust effect of the
withholding-only regulatory scheme. It was after her deportation that Mirabel
experienced the horrific persecution that caused her to flee; yet, when she arrived
in the U.S., she was unable to apply for asylum due solely to her prior removal
order. And contrary to the Perez-Guzman court’s conclusion, this result is not
the byproduct of a “difficult policy choice” the agency made.216 Instead, the
sounder conclusion is that it is arbitrary because it furthers no policy goals: if
permitted to apply for asylum, Mirabel must still prove her eligibility through
the same process as in withholding-only proceedings, and therefore the DHS
must expend the same resources in litigating asylum claims.
Notably, this regulatory scheme also creates a direct conflict with the subpart
of the asylum provision that provides for successive asylum applications based
on changed circumstances.217 Under the withholding-only regulatory scheme,
however, successive asylum applications are not available to those with
reinstated removal orders. Under the same regulation, however, it is available
to noncitizens who remain in the U.S. in violation of their initial removal
order.218 The effect, therefore, is to reward those who refuse to comply with
removal orders by allowing them to reapply for asylum, while punishing
noncitizens who comply with their removal order and subsequently reenter
based on new or renewed persecution in their home country.219 This effect is
untenable.
Additionally, a court should not give deference to the agency’s interpretation
because “the agency wrongly believe[d] that interpretation is compelled by
Congress” when promulgating it. 220 Here, the agency promulgated the
withholding-only regulation based on a literal interpretation of the INA that the
agency believed was compelled by Congress; thus, the agency believed illegally
reentering noncitizens are subject to a mandatory, unreviewable reinstatement
215. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419 (1999) (“Under the immigration laws,
withholding is distinct from asylum, although the two forms of relief serve similar purposes.”).
216. Gila River Indian Cmty., 729 F.3d at 1149 (finding that deferring to an agency’s
“unexplained caveat would permit the agency to sidestep its duty to bring its expertise to bear on
the ‘difficult policy choices’ it is tasked with making” (quoting Negusie v. Holder, 55 U.S. 511,
523 (2009))).
217. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(C)–(D) (2012).
218. AILA Amicus Brief, supra note 112, at 26 (noting that “it makes no sense that [a
noncitizen] who complied with a removal order in the first instance would be barred from asylum,
while [a noncitizen] who evaded removal could be considered for such protection, even if only
when there are changed circumstances”).
219. See id.
220. Gila River Indian Cmty., 729 F.3d at 1149 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Deference
to an agency’s interpretation of a statute is not appropriate when the agency wrongly believes that
interpretation is compelled by Congress” (quoting PKD Labs, Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 798 (D.C.
Cir. 2004)).

648

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 66:613

of removal order and also face a mandatory bar to asylum access. However, the
agency also maintains that it may exercise its discretion in reinstating removal
orders, which allows some noncitizens to apply for asylum despite being initially
subject to a reinstated removal order.221 Indeed, the agency recently exercised
that discretion and allowed a noncitizen with a reinstated removal order to seek
asylum.222 This departure from its previous hard line is strong evidence that the
withholding-only regulation was premised on the agency’s incorrect belief that
the mandatory reinstatement created a mandatory bar to asylum access was
compelled by Congress, a belief the agency no longer maintains and,
accordingly, no deference is owed to it. In any event, the agency has issued no
guidelines for exercising this discretion, which leaves this decision to the
“unfettered discretion of lower-level officers.” 223 Not only does this create
absurd results, but it also conflicts with clear Congressional intent that such
weighty decisions are to be made by asylum officers and immigration judges.224
Finally, a court’s deference to the agency’s interpretation is unwarranted
because an interpretation that avoids these absurd, unjust results exists—the
same construction all other considerations point to: allowing any noncitizen to
apply for asylum, subject only to the exceptions enumerated in § 1158(a).225
For these reasons, the Perez-Guzman court erred in giving deference to the
agency’s regulatory scheme. And to avoid that error, other courts finding
ambiguity or silence in the INA on this issue should not give deference to the
agency’s interpretation.
III. FAIRNESS MATTERS: “ANY” NONCITIZEN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO APPLY
FOR ASYLUM
Even if a court disagrees with the previous Part’s statutory analysis, there are
still numerous policy reasons for amending the statutory or regulatory scheme,
thereby allowing noncitizens with reinstated removal orders to apply for asylum.
Many of these reasons stem from the errors CBP officers routinely make in
issuing expedited removal orders. These errors often result in CBP issuing errant
removal orders, which permanently bar bona fide asylum seekers from future
asylum access. In addition to examining the evidence of these errors, this Part
also addresses the secondary consequences of these errors, such as how
immigration judges routinely deny asylum based on adverse credibility findings
rooted in the inaccurate CBP interview records. Drawing on these problems in
221. AILA Amicus Brief, supra note 112, at 27–28.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 28.
224. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (explicitly delegating the responsibility of
deciding the fate of those seeking asylum and withholding relief to asylum officers and immigration
judges).
225. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892) (“If a literal
construction of the words of a statute [lead to an absurd result], the act must be so construed as to
avoid the absurdity.”).
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the expedited removal context, this Part concludes by arguing that in the
reinstatement of removal process these problems are likely even more rampant,
given that the reinstatement process has far fewer procedural safeguards against
the removal of bona fide refugees to situations of persecution.
A. Documented Errors in the Expedited Removal Process
As noted in Part I, when creating the expedited removal process, Congress left
the delicate first step of screening potential asylum seekers in the hands of CBP
officers, in addition to granting CBP the unreviewable authority to enter
expedited removal orders. 226 These officers, who are “neither lawyers nor
judges, . . . hold extraordinary power in determining the fate of arriving asylum
seekers.” 227 But in this same provision, Congress also carved out a critical
safeguard against the errant removal of bona fide asylum seekers: when
noncitizens merely “indicate” a fear of persecution or an intention to apply for
asylum, CBP must refer them to a credible-fear interview, rather than deporting
them.228
To comply with this statutory provision, DHS regulations and internal policies
instruct CBP officers to complete these three steps when interviewing
noncitizens flagged for expedited removal:
1. Read Form I-867A, verbatim.229 This form, a script, advises the
noncitizen that lying to the CBP officer could result in criminal or civil
charges or being barred from immigration benefits; that a removal
order automatically bars the noncitizen from admission for five or
more years; that the U.S. law protects noncitizens from persecution;
and that the noncitizen should tell the officer of any fears.230

226. See discussion supra Section I.B.1.
227. Right to Asylum Letter, supra note 27, at 3.
228. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (“If an immigration officer determines that an alien . . .
indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution, the officer shall refer
the alien for an interview by an asylum officer.”).
229. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2016) (“The examining immigration officer shall read (or have
read) to the alien all information contained on Form I-867A.”).
230. U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., Form I-867A (1997) advises:
U.S. law provides protection to certain persons who face persecution, harm or torture
upon return to their home country. If you fear or have a concern about being removed
from the United States or about being sent home, you should tell me so during this
interview because you may not have another chance. You will have the opportunity to
speak privately and confidentially to another officer about your fear or concern. That
officer will determine if you should remain in the United States and not be removed
because of that fear.
See Kuck, supra note 25, at 252 app. A (providing sample of Form I-867A). Notably, like Emely,
many asylum seekers have had only a few years of elementary school education at the most; thus,
even if CBP reads this paragraph to the noncitizen, it is unlike the noncitizen will meaningfully
comprehend it.
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2. Ask the noncitizen the following questions from Form I-867B,
verbatim:
a. “Why did you leave your home country or country of last
residence?”
“Do you have any fear or concern about being returned to
your home country or being removed from the United
States?”
b. “Would you be harmed if you are returned to your home
country or country of last residence?”
c. “Do you have any questions or is there anything else you
would like to add?”231
3. Document the noncitizen’s responses, and allow the noncitizen to
review and revise this record prior to signing and attesting to its
accuracy.232
A federal statute, regulation, and the most-recently available CBP guidance
further instruct that during this screening interview, CBP officers are not to
evaluate the merits of the noncitizen’s potential asylum claim in deciding
whether to issue a referral to an asylum officer; that is, CBP officers are to issue
asylum interview referrals if the noncitizen indicates any fear in any fashion, and
without weighing the plausibility or credibility of the noncitizen’s fear. 233 This
231. Id. (providing sample of Form I-867B).
232. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (“[T]he examining immigration officer shall record the
alien’s response to the questions contained on Form I-867B, and have the alien read (or have read
to him or her) the statement, and the alien shall sign and initial each page of the statement and each
correction.”); see also Kuck, supra note 25, at 253 app. A (providing sample Form I-867B).
233. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (“If an alien subject to
the expedited removal provisions indicates an intention to apply for asylum, or expresses a fear of
persecution or torture, or a fear of return to his or her country, the inspecting officer shall not
proceed further with removal of the alien until the alien has been referred for an interview by an
asylum officer . . . .”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION, INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL § 17.15(b)(1) (rev. 2006) [hereinafter INSPECTOR’S
FIELD MANUAL]. The CBP Inspector’s Field Manual mandates:
[I]f the alien indicates in any fashion . . . that he or she has a fear of persecution, or that
he or she has suffered or [might] suffer torture, you are required to refer the alien to an
asylum officer for a credible fear determination. . . . [T]he inspecting officer has a
responsibility to ensure that anyone who indicates a fear of persecution . . . is referred to
an asylum officer for a credible fear determination. Inspectors should consider verbal as
well as non-verbal cues given by the alien. The obligatory questions on the Form I-867B
are designed to help in determining whether the alien has such fear. Do not ask detailed
questions on the nature of the alien’s fear of persecution or torture: leave that for the
asylum officer. In determining whether to refer the alien, inspectors should not make
eligibility determinations or weigh the strength of the claims, nor should they make
credibility determinations . . . . The inspector should err on the side of caution, apply the
criteria generously, and refer to the asylum officer any questionable cases . . . . Do not
make any evaluation as to the merits of such fear; that is the responsibility of the asylum
officer.
Id.
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is an essential component of the interview, since most asylum seekers often have
hidden the source of their fears, such as their sexual orientation or gender
identity, their entire lives in order to survive, and therefore expecting these same
individuals to readily disclose this deeply-personal information to a stranger—
especially a government official who just warned them about the civil, criminal,
and immigration penalties that could arise from their statements—is
unreasonable and unrealistic.234
Despite these requirements, however, human rights organizations and
immigration advocates have consistently reported that “CBP’s processing of
arriving asylum seekers is marred by careless errors, subversion of even minimal
procedures, willful indifference, and, in some cases, outright intimidation and
coercion.”235 These findings are not new, either. In 2005, the bipartisan U.S.
Commission of International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) similarly reported
that CBP was in substantial noncompliance in every aspect of the expedited
removal screening process, and that these errors were resulting in the errant
removal of bona fide asylum seekers. 236 USCIRF’s report was based on
234. Federal courts and legal experts have acknowledged a host of legitimate reasons why
asylum seekers are hesitant to disclose their fears to CBP. See Allen Keller et al., Evaluation of
Credible Fear Referral in Expedited Removal at Ports of Entry in the United States, in 2 REPORT
ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: EXPERT REPORTS 21 n.22 (2005),
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/ERS_RptVolII.pdf
(noting reluctance to disclose fear due to “considerable distrust of interviewing officers,” such as a
belief CBP officers were lying, and CBP officers using “sarcastic” and “demeaning” behavior, in
addition to “repeatedly” shouting at noncitizens prior to being interviewed); see, e.g., Moab v.
Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing reluctance to disclose sexual orientation);
Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing reluctance to disclose personal
information); Kebede v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing reluctance to
disclose rape).
235. Right to Asylum Letter, supra note 27, at 10; see also Brief for American Immigration
Lawyers Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch,
813 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-60546) (“Many bona fide refugees are wrongly subject to
expedited removal upon fleeing persecution and arriving in the United States.”); AILA Amicus
Brief, supra note 112, at 19 (“Despite Congress’s efforts to ensure asylum’s availability to those
fleeing persecution, the process frequently fails.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “YOU DON’T HAVE
RIGHTS HERE”: U.S. BORDER SCREENING AND RETURNS OF CENTRAL AMERICANS TO RISK OF
SERIOUS HARM 5 (Oct. 2014) [hereinafter HRW 2014 REPORT], https://www.hrw.org/sites
/default/files/reports/us1014_web_0.pdf (“The flaws [in screening for asylum seekers in expedited
removal] are readily apparent today at the U.S.-Mexico border.”); Letter to DHS Secretary Johnson
and Attorney General Lynch on Protecting the Right to Seek Asylum, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Nov. 17, 2015, 2:55 PM) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch Letter], https://www.hrw.org/news
/2015/11/17/letter-dhs-secretary-johnson-an-attorney-general-lynch-protecting-right-seek-asylum
(“Well-documented deficiencies, particularly in the expedited removal process, result in protection
claims overlooked or ignored, all too often deporting asylum seekers back to countries where their
lives are at risk.”).
236. Pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 6474(a)(2)(A)–(D), USCIRF was to determine whether
immigration officers carrying out the expedited removal process are:
(A) Improperly encouraging such aliens to withdraw their applications for admission.
(B) Incorrectly failing to refer such aliens for an interview by an asylum officer for a
determination of whether they have a credible fear of persecution . . . .

652

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 66:613

hundreds of hours of on-sight observation, the thorough review of numerous Afiles, and analysis of immigration judges’ reasons for denying asylum
applications. 237 As discussed below, the USCIRF report, along with other
human rights reports, found that (1) CBP officers are not reading the mandatory
script during the screening interview; (2) even when noncitizens expressly claim
a fear, CBP officers refuse to provide credible fear interview referrals; (3) CBP
officers frequently discourage noncitizens from applying for asylum and harass
those who do; and (4) CBP officers’ keep inaccurate records of noncitizens’
responses, yet immigration judges commonly use these records as a basis for
denying asylum relief. Due to these errors, reinstated expedited-removal orders
should not serve as a bar to asylum access.
1. CBP Officers Are Not Reading the Mandatory Script During the
Screening Interview
USCIRF found that beginning with the most basic requirement of the
screening interview, reading a script, CBP was noncompliant.238 For example,
USCIRF found that CBP officers often failed to read any of the information on
Form I-867A—including the portion of the form explaining why the officer is
interviewing the noncitizen; that is, to determine if they have a fear of removal—
and in only 44.1% of the cases observed did CBP officers read the protectionbased paragraph stating that U.S. law protects the persecuted and that this may
be the noncitizen’s only opportunity to voice such fears.239
USCIRF further found that this noncompliance directly and “significantly”
impacted the likelihood of a noncitizen’s chance of moving forward in the
asylum application process—obtaining a credible fear interview—largely
because “many [noncitizens] may not understand the purpose of the . . .
interview and may not realize that this interview is their primary, if not sole
opportunity to express concerns or seek asylum.”240 For example, when CBP
officers did read the protection-based paragraph of I-867A (“U.S. law provides
protection to certain persons who face persecution, . . .”), the noncitizen was an

(C) Incorrectly removing such aliens to a country where they may be persecuted.
(D) Detaining such aliens improperly or in inappropriate conditions.
22 U.S.C. § 6474(a)(2)(A)–(D) (Supp. V 1999).
237. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 3.
238. Id. at 13–14, 29–30 (reporting that “[a]lthough reading the I-867A form is a required
element of every [CBP screening] interview in which Expedited Removal will be applied, we
observed many cases in which the requisite information was not provided to the alien. In many
other cases the alien was simply handed a photocopy containing the necessary information but was
not read the information or offered any further explanation.”).
239. See id. at 14 tbl.21.
240. Id. at 28–29.
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astounding seven times more likely to express a fear resulting in credible fear
interview referral.241
Similarly, USCIRF found the likelihood of a credible fear interview referral
increased significantly with each additional, mandatory, question asked from
Form I-867B.242 For example, if the CBP officer asked either, “Do you have
any fear of returning?” or “Would you be harmed if you returned?” the
likelihood of credible fear interview referral increased from 5.3% (when no fear
questions were asked) to 8.6%.243 When both fear-based questions were asked,
the likelihood of referral jumped to 18%. 244 And while this data could be
construed as evidence that these questions are “prompting” noncitizens to claim
a fear of return, USCIRF concluded otherwise, finding that “there was little
evidence that [noncitizens] are prompted to claim fear by the I-867 information
and questions,” since about 63% of the observed individuals “spontaneously
expressed a fear of returning to their home country during the question and
answer session or in response to the question, ‘Why did you leave your home
country or country of last residence?’” (a non-fear based question).245
Ultimately, this data shows that noncitizens simply do not understand the
purpose of the screening interview because no one is explaining it to them. These
noncitizens are then deported under an expedited removal order; in an instant,
their only chance to seek asylum in the U.S. is gone.
2. Even When Noncitizens Expressly Claim a Fear, CBP Officers Refuse to
Provide Credible Fear Interview Referrals
CBP officers are required to issue a credible fear referral if a noncitizen
“indicates” a fear of persecution or intent to apply for asylum. 246 However,
USCIRF found that one in six noncitizens who clearly expressed a fear during
the CBP screening interview—that is, they far exceeded the “indication”
threshold—were not given a credible fear referral. 247 Instead, CBP either
removed them pursuant to an order of expedited removal or allowed them to
withdraw their application for admission and were then sent home.248 Nearly a

241. Id. at 13, 17 (finding “[t]he odds of being referred for a Credible Fear interview increased
seven times when the [four]th paragraph [on Form I-867A] was read to aliens relative to when it
was not”).
242. Id. at 17 (finding “the likelihood of a Credible Fear referral increased with each additional
fear question asked”).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 21.
246. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
247. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 29 (“Even when the alien expressed a fear of return,
referral for a Credible Fear interview was not guaranteed. One in six aliens who expressed a fear
of return [to CBP during the screening interview] were placed in Expedited Removal or allowed to
withdraw their application for admission.”).
248. Id.

654

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 66:613

decade after USCIRF’s report was released, Human Rights Watch (HRW)
conducted additional field research and found this problem had worsened.249
Two of the individuals USCIRF observed who expressed a fear of removal
but were not referred to a credible fear interview were women from countries in
Central America where rampant persecution is well documented.250 One woman
spontaneously and tearfully begged the CBP officer to help her because she
feared her ex-husband.251 The CBP officer responded by warning her that she
should cooperate or she would be “in trouble.”252 Then, immediately before
asking her the I-867B fear questions, the officer cautioned that if she made a fear
claim—even though she already had—she would not see her family for a long
time.253 The woman ultimately withdrew her application for admission into the
U.S., but not before the CBP officer noted in her A-file that the woman’s
response to a question about her fear level was, “[n]ot a real fear. My exhusband does not like me.”254 The second woman claimed a fear, too, however,
when she asked how long she would be in custody and what would happen to
her son, the officer responded, “[i]f you say you’re afraid[,] you will go into
detention for an unknown number of days until you have a hearing,” and that
she would not be able to contact her son, who did not live in the U.S.255 She,
too, withdrew her application for admission.256
In another instance, USCIRF researchers observed a political activist from
South Asia express a fear that Islamic fundamentalists in his home country
would kill him if he returned.257 However, after the CBP officer confirmed that
the man would be detained if he claimed a fear, he retracted his claimed fear.258
The CBP officer did not refer him for a credible fear interview and he was
subsequently removed on an expedited removal order.259
The 2014 HRW investigation also found that CBP repeatedly failed to issue
credible fear interview referrals despite numerous noncitizens’ explicit
expression of fear. 260 Nearly all of these noncitizens were from Honduras,
where “rampant crime and impunity for human rights abuses” are continually

249. HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 5. To create this report, HRW interviewed thirtyfive Central American migrants in detention in the U.S. or recently deported to Honduras. All the
interviewed migrants expressed a fear of return, including those who were deported, many of whom
“had fear[s] so acute that they were living in hiding, afraid to go out in public.” Id.
250. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 23.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 24.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 21.
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rising and well documented. 261 In spite of this, CBP referred only 1.9% of
Hondurans in expedited removal and reinstatement proceedings for credible fear
interviews; the remaining 81% were deported.262 In one instance,
[a] man who was deported in September 2014 told Human Rights
Watch that when he informed a Border Patrol officer of the threats to
his life in Honduras, “[h]e told me there was nothing I could do and I
didn’t have a case so there was no reason to dispute the deportation. .
. . I told him he was violating my right to life and he said, ‘[y]ou don’t
have rights here.’”263
CBP’s refusal to issue referrals to these individuals, despite the fact that they
have clearly expressed a fear, is potentially due to CBP’s improper judging of
the merits of the asylum claim, a job Congress expressly delegated to asylum
officers and immigration judges. 264 USCIRF’s researchers observed that in
“many of the cases in which fear was expressed during the [CBP] interview but
no referral was made, the nature of the fear expressed may not have been
sufficient justification for an asylum hearing,” since, at the time, CBP’s internal
guidelines instructed that referrals were not required when the noncitizen’s
expressed fear would clearly not qualify them for asylum.265 This policy, which
has most likely been abandoned,266 obviously conflicted with the statute and
regulation’s purpose and statutory mandate that CBP issue a referral if a fear is
“indicated,” without regard to the type of fear, and necessarily undermines the
validity of any expedited removal order issued while this policy was in place.267
261. Id. at 12.
262. Id. at 21.
263. Id. at 8–9.
264. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 22 (reporting that “[i]n many of the cases in which fear
was expressed during the [CBP screening] interview but no referral was made, the nature of the
fear expressed may not have been sufficient justification for an asylum hearing”).
265. Id. at 20 (noting that the CBP Field Manual indicates that when “the fear would clearly
not qualify an individual for asylum[, the noncitizen] need not necessarily be referred [to a credible
fear interview]”).
266. In December 2011, CBP posted a redacted copy of the 2006 Instructor’s Field Manual
(IFM), which contains CBP’s internal policies and procedures. This IFM clearly instructs CBP
officers to issue referrals any time a fear is expressed, regardless of the nature of the fear. See
INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 233, § 17.15(b)(1). However, the IFM has since been
replaced with an electronic Officer Reference Tool, which has not been made public. See
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNSEL, CBP RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL 1 n.4 (Oct. 1,
2014), http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/foia_documents/access_to_
counsel_cbp_foia_factsheet.pdf. And in April 2014, CBP’s Office of Field Operations
acknowledged that CBP is still using the IFM as a “reference,” so it is unclear what guidance CBP
is currently using and what its policies actually state. Id.
267. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012); SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 216 (noting that
during the drafting of Forms I-867A and B, “INS officials assured the advocates that they were
well aware that the [CBP] inspectors would not be trained in the nuances of asylum law (e.g., the
requirement that only five specified grounds for feared persecution, such as persecution on account
of religion, qualified an alien for asylum). Therefore, the form did not prompt inspectors to ask
further questions about the nature of the alien’s fear, and they would not do so.”).
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Also tending to show that CBP officers are still weighing the merits of asylum
seekers’ claims is the fact that despite employing a heightened evidentiary
burden in the asylum interview than the burden of proof in the CBP screening
interview, asylum officers find credible fears a vast majority of the time: in
FY2013, 92% of all credible fear interviews ended in a credible fear finding.268
Although this statistic could show that CBP agents are screening asylum
applicants exceptionally well, that conclusion is unlikely, especially given the
data showing that a miniscule number of Hondurans receive a credible fear
referral despite the ample documentation of ongoing human rights abuses in that
country,269 and the fact that CBP guidelines do not require any inquiry into the
nature of the fear, and instead require only an “indication” of a fear, before
mandating CBP issue a credible fear interview referral.270
Rather, a more likely conclusion is that CBP officers are issuing referrals
haphazardly, such as when the officer feels the individual is deserving of asylum
or when the officer thinks the fear is legally valid. 271 Regardless of CBP
officers’ motives, the high number of credible fear findings by asylum officers
strongly indicates that CBP officers have expanded the already immense power
Congress delegated to them by absorbing the responsibility Congress delegated
to trained asylum officers and immigration judges, not “low-level” employees
of the federal government. 272 This is not only contrary to Congress’s intent
when enacting IIRIRA, but also warrants the elimination of the reinstatement
bar to asylum access.
3. CBP Officers Frequently Discourage Noncitizens from Applying for
Asylum and Harass Those Who Do
The USCIRF and HRW reports both document that CBP officers commonly
discourage asylum seekers from applying for asylum at all.273 Recent reports
268. See Asylum Abuse: Is It Overwhelming Our Borders?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) [hereinafter Asylum Abuse] (stating DHS data shows that
“USCIS makes positive credible fear findings in 92% of all cases decided on the merits” (statement
of Rep. Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary)); see also Ana Campoy, Illegal
Immigrants Seeking Asylum Face a Higher Bar, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 28, 2014, 7:02 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/illegal-immigrants-seeking-asylum-face-a-higher-bar-1411945370
(reporting that in 2014, asylum officers found a credible fear 63% of the time in the month of July,
and 83% of the time six months earlier).
269. See e.g., HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 8.
270. See INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 233, § 17.15(b)(1), (providing only that
“the inspector may ask a few additional follow-up questions to ascertain the general nature of the
fear or concern” during the screening interview (emphasis added)).
271. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 22, 29 (reporting that “some CBP officers make de facto
assessments of the legitimacy of expressed fears, returning aliens that they perceive to be
inappropriate and referring those that they perceive as warranting asylum”).
272. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 209 (referring to CBP officers as “low-level” employees).
273. See Keller et al., supra note 234, at 23–24 (reporting numerous instances of CBP officers’
apparent attempts to dissuade asylum seekers from making fear claims); see also HRW 2014
REPORT, supra note 235, at 26.
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confirm that this is an ongoing, worsening problem.274 These tactics ranged
from possibly deliberate attempts—such as incorrectly telling noncitizens that
because they entered without inspection, they may not have an opportunity to
present their asylum case, and telling noncitizens that if they made a fear claim,
they would be detained for three weeks to a month or more—to blatant refusal
to allow the noncitizen to apply.275 For example, CBP agents reportedly turned
away five asylum seekers at the U.S.-Mexico border, telling them to “go away,”
to “go back to where [you] came from,” and forcing them back into Mexico,
despite their requests for asylum and despite the fact that they were African and
Middle Eastern, not Mexican.276 This group returned the next day, and as one
man tearfully begged CBP agents to allow him to enter, CBP officers handcuffed
them.277 Their persistence ultimately paid off: CBP referred all five individuals
to credible fear interviews.278
USCIRF reported that of the noncitizens CBP encouraged to retract their fear
claims, CBP subsequently referred two of the men who refused to retract their
claims to credible fear interviews.279 In CBP’s attempt to persuade the first man
to retract his claim, the CBP officer stated, “[w]hat you are experiencing is a
personal problem, not one the U.S. offers people asylum for[.]”280 The CBP
further stated that if the man did claim a fear, he would be in detention for three
months, and that “I know for sure you will be deported.”281 To the other man,
CBP officers described the undesirable characteristics of detention in detail, and
repeatedly asked the noncitizen if he had a fear of returning, in what USCIRF
described as an apparent attempt to elicit a different response, since the man had
already expressed a fear of return.282
274. Letter from Eight Immigration and Human Rights Orgs. to John Roth, Inspector Gen.,
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & Megan H. Mack, Officer of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. 1 (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/
general_litigation/cbp_systemic_denial_of_entry_to_asylum_seekers_advocacy_document.pdf
(reporting individual stories of “numerous adult men and women, families and unaccompanied
children who, over the past several months, were denied entry to the United States at ports of entry
along the U.S.-Mexico border despite having asserted a fear of returning to their home countries or
an intention to seek asylum under U.S. law”); Joshua Partlow, U.S. Border Officials Are Illegally
Turning Away Asylum Seekers, Critics Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-border-officials-are-illegally-turning-away-asylumseekers-critics-say/2017/01/16/f7f5c54a-c6d0-11e6-acda-59924caa2450_story.
html?utm_term=.e6e42d4abdc9 (reporting numerous individuals have claimed they have been
refused entry despite claiming fear in their home countries, which one immigration expert states
“is happening on a daily basis”).
275. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 23–24.
276. Id. at 24.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 23.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.

658

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 66:613

Similarly, HRW reported that CBP’s interviews were “brief and focused on
explaining additional consequences of deportation.” 283 One migrant woman
reported that “[a]ll [CBP] said to me was that if I came back they would give me
six months in prison.”284 CBP told another asylum-seeker, a man who had fled
Honduras after being shot and seeing his mother murdered by gang members,
“don’t apply [for asylum], 90[%] of the people who do don’t get it,” and then
instructed him to sign his removal paperwork, saying, “Fingerprint, fingerprint,”
repeatedly even though the man did not understand what he was signing. 285
When one noncitizen refused to sign his removal paperwork due to his fear of
removal, CBP responded by insulting him, detaining him for six days in a frigid
cell, and waking him every few hours to move him to a different “icebox.”286
Similarly, USCIRF observed CBP officers use “aggressive or intimidating
behaviors” toward asylum seekers.287 This included “multiple occasions” of
CBP shackling noncitizens in expedited removal, CBP telling a Central
American man that he was a “woman” and a “sissy” who sat “like a girl,” and a
CBP officer calling a noncitizen a shockingly-profane word in the presence of
another noncitizen.288
Given the nature of harm asylum seekers have endured and fled—often
perpetrated by or with the acquiescence of their government’s agents—these
tactics employed by a uniformed, armed CBP officer are likely to be extremely
effective in deterring asylum seekers from asking for protection.289 Based on
these considerations, the reinstatement of prior removal orders should not serve
as a bar to asylum access.
4. CBP Officers Keep Inaccurate Records of Noncitizens’ Responses, Yet
Immigration Judges Commonly Use These Records As a Basis For Denying
Asylum Relief
In addition to refusing to refer noncitizens expressing a fear of removal to a
credible fear interview, CBP often fails to make any record of that fear. For
283. HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 27; see also Janet A. Gilboy, Implications of
“Third-Party” Involvement in Enforcement: The INS, Illegal Travelers, and International Airlines,
31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 505, 514–17 (1997) (noting that when noncitizens arrive on flights that
make brief stopovers at an airport, CBP would rush through screening interviews so as to not disrupt
flight schedules and avoid having to find detention space for the noncitizen).
284. HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 27.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 27–28 & n.53 (explaining that “‘[i]cebox’ or hielera is how migrants commonly
refer to Border Patrol detention, in reference to the cold temperatures in the cells”).
287. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 26 tbl.5.1 (noting that during roughly 10% of all screening
interviews, CBP officers raised their voice, interrupted, used sarcasm/ridicule, were demanding,
and left the room without explanation).
288. Id. at 26–27.
289. HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 8 (“Uniformed CBP officers are usually armed
while apprehending migrants; when they interview the migrants a few hours or days later their
holsters are empty but visible . . . .”).
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example, USCIRF “found that when CBP officials failed to ask the relevant fear
questions [from Form I-867B], the official record frequently indicated that these
questions had been asked and answered, typically containing just the word ‘no’
in response to fear questions that had not been asked.”290 Other times, CBP
officers recorded only a portion of the information the noncitizen disclosed.291
USCIRF also found that the noncitizen’s signature on these forms as an
attestation to the accuracy of the record is an inadequate safeguard against
inaccurate A-file records, since nearly 17% of time, CBP did not even ask for
the noncitizen’s signature, and when they did, this was usually as an instruction,
not as an invitation to review the record. 292 For these reasons, USCIRF
concluded that these administrative records are “deeply flawed,” a conclusion
several circuit courts of appeals have also reached.293
Despite this, immigration judges routinely treat these administrative records
as the noncitizen’s personal statements, rather than as a summary of part of what
the noncitizen might have said.294 And further compounding the inaccuracies
made in the record is the fact that the noncitizen’s burden of proof increases at
each stage of the preliminary screening, culminating at the merits hearing before
the immigration judge.295 Thus, the level of detail necessary for the noncitizen
to move to the next screening is far less when before the CBP officer than when
before the immigration judge.296 Despite this, the DHS and immigration judges
frequently treat the increase in detail contained in the administrative record as

290. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 30.
291. Id.
292. Id. (“When [noncitizens] were asked to confirm their statements, most [noncitizens] were
neither asked to read the statements, nor had their statements read to them, but were simply told to
sign the forms.”).
293. Jastram & Hartsough, supra note 32, at 88; see also Qing Hua Lin v. Holder, 736 F.3d
343, 355 (4th Cir. 2013) (Thacker, J., concurring) (citing cases from the Second, Third, Seventh,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits to show that “the circuit courts of appeals have uniformly held that
these particular interviews should be carefully scrutinized for reliability before being utilized by
the fact-finder to evaluate an applicant’s credibility”).
294. Jastram & Hartsough, supra note 32, at 67, 88 (reporting that in 56.6% of the cases
introducing the CBP and asylum interview records, these records were used to impeach the
noncitizen’s merits hearing testimony).
295. Initially, the standard for issuing a credible fear interview is met when noncitizen
“indicates” intent to apply for asylum or expresses a fear of return. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (2016).
Then, the standard for finding credible fear is met when noncitizen shows “significant possibility”
of establishing asylum eligibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (2012). Ultimately, the standard
for establishing asylum eligibility in a merits hearing is met when the noncitizen has a “wellfounded fear” of persecution. Id. § 1101(a)(42); see INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439–
40 (1987) (holding that a well-founded fear is a “reasonable possibility” that the applicant will be
persecuted).
296. For a helpful comparison of these growing evidentiary burdens, see Jastram & Hartsough,
supra note 32, at 66 tbl.3.
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an inconsistency in the noncitizen’s story, which often results in a wellinsulated,297 adverse credibility finding.298
These compounding flaws have two things in common. First, they result in
the errant removal of bona fide asylum seekers, sometimes ending in their death,
or as in David’s case, being shot in the eye.299 Second, these particular errors
arise only in the expedited removal and reinstatement of removal context, since
asylum claims asserted defensively—that is, after being placed in removal
proceedings—are heard by immigration judges only, and therefore no other
interviews, be it with CBP or an asylum officer, are part of this process.300
Due to these errors, reinstated removal orders should not serve as a permanent
bar to asylum access.

297. Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding immigration judge’s
credibility findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review).
298. See, e.g., Jastram & Hartsough, supra note 32, at 68, 87 (finding that in at least 39% of
cases, immigration judges deny asylum claims based on “deeply flawed” administrative records
created by CBP and asylum officers, and “[w]here the prior records were cited as an element of the
decision, protection was almost always denied”). Indeed, in the Author’s experience representing
numerous asylum seekers appealing adverse credibility findings, immigration judges routinely pin
cite the “transcript” of the asylum interview—even though they know this is only a summary of the
noncitizen’s testimony—in finding noncitizens are not credible and consequently deny their asylum
and withholding claims.
299. See sources cited supra note 129.
300. See, e.g., Asylum Abuse, supra note 268, at 49 (explaining that unlike asylum claims
asserted affirmatively or during expedited or reinstatement removal proceedings, a noncitizen in
removal proceedings “raises the issue of asylum during the beginning of the removal process. The
matter is then litigated in immigration court, using formal procedures such as the presentation of
evidence and direct and cross examination.” (prepared statement of Ruth Ellen Wasem,
Immigration Policy Specialist, Congressional Research Service)).
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B. With No Statutory or Regulatory Requirement to Inquire About the
Noncitizen’s Fear of Persecution in the Reinstatement of Removal Interview,
CBP is Simply Repeating These Errors During the Reinstatement of Removal
Process
The errors arising in the expedited removal process also highlight the obvious
need for more guidance in the reinstatement of removal process, where there is
no statutory or regulatory requirement that CBP ask any fear-based questions or
provide an explanation of the interview.301 Thus, even if CBP is following its
former internal guidance to ask one question regarding the noncitizen’s fear of
removal, it is unlikely the noncitizen will understand why the officer is asking
this question since no guidance instructs the officer to explain the purpose of the
interview. Consequently, the noncitizen may not divulge these personal details
to a government official under these circumstances. Indeed, USCIRF concluded
that when officers explained the interview’s purpose, noncitizens were seven
times more likely to be referred to a credible fear interview.302 Furthermore,
even if CBP officers ask the single question officers may be required to ask, this
one question is still insufficient given USCIRF’s finding that the more fearbased questions asked increased the likelihood of an expression of fear.303 Also,
given CBP’s refusal to issue credible fear referrals even when the noncitizen
explicitly expressed a fear in the expedited removal context, it is extremely
likely that this problem also occurs in the reinstatement of removal context.
Finally, cases like Emely and David’s show that CBP does not always inquire
about noncitizens’ fear of persecution prior to deporting them. Emely was raped
and impregnated by a gang leader for being gay, yet CBP repeatedly deported
her without ever asking about these events; it was not until her third illegal entry
that CBP finally asked her about her fear of removal. Similarly, David, who was
removed prior to being persecuted on account of her gender identity, was not
asked about her fear of persecution during her reinstatement interview, despite
this being her first time seeking protection in the U.S. Thus, even if CBP is
required to inquire about the noncitizen’s fear, these cases, coupled with the
expedited removal data, show that CBP is not complying with that requirement.
Based on the rampant errors in the expedited removal process and the
evidence indicating that similar noncompliance occurs in the reinstatement
process, individuals in reinstatement proceedings should be permitted to apply
for asylum and be interviewed based on at least the same guidelines that the DHS
has established for the expedited removal interview.

301. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2016).
302. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 17 (finding “[t]he odds of being referred for a Credible
Fear interview increased seven times when the [four]th paragraph [on Form I-867A] was read to
aliens relative to when it was not”).
303. Id. at 17–18 (finding “the likelihood of a Credible Fear referral increased with each
additional fear question asked”).
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IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The legislative history and statutory analysis explored in Parts I and II reveal
that, contrary to circuit court interpretation and the federal regulation, the INA’s
asylum and reinstatement of removal provisions can be interpreted in a manner
giving both provisions full effect, thereby allowing any noncitizen, even those
with reinstated removal orders, to apply for asylum, subject only to the
exceptions set forth in the asylum provision. Part III showed that removing the
reinstatement bar also furthers important policy considerations. This Part makes
recommendations tailored to federal and immigration courts, the DHS, and
Congress that, if followed, would not only further these policy goals, but perhaps
most importantly, would save the lives of people who have come to the U.S.
under the most dire circumstances.
A. Recommendations for Congress
Congress should amend the reinstatement provision to reflect that asylum
seekers, regardless of a reinstated order of removal, may apply for asylum and
withholding of removal. In addition to the many reasons addressed in this
Article and by numerous other experts raising due process concerns regarding
the expedited removal process, this amendment is especially necessary due to
the pervasive political environment breeding fear mongering regarding refugees,
led, no less, by individuals vying to lead the executive branch, and also due to
the greatest global refugee crisis in history. Failing to make this amendment
places lives at stake and allows a message of fear and hate to trample on the core
American value of protecting those seeking refuge. Thus, Congress should
amend the reinstatement provision as follows:
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United
States illegally after having been removed or having departed
voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is
reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened
or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief
under this chapter, except for relief under section 1158 and subsection
(b)(3) of this section, and the alien shall be removed under the prior
order at any time after the reentry.
Additionally, to further reiterate its commitment to protecting asylum seekers
and also as a remedial measure for the well-documented errors resulting in the
errant expedited removal of bona fide refugees, Congress should pass a recently
introduced bill, the Fair Day in Court for Kids Act of 2016.304 If enacted, this

304. Fair Day in Court for Kids Act of 2016, H.R. 4646, 114th Cong. (2016) (introduced in the
House of Rep. Feb. 26, 2016). Another important remedial measure Congress could take is by
making the reinstatement amendment retroactive; that is, in addition to amending § 1231(a)(5),
Congress should also instruct the Attorney General to allow noncitizens who were previously
barred from seeking asylum due to the reinstatement of their prior removal order to reopen their
claim for relief and seek asylum pursuant to § 1158.
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bill would require the DHS to appoint lawyers at the government’s expense to
represent victims of persecution or torture and other vulnerable noncitizens in
removal proceedings, in addition to mandating that the DHS give noncitizens
their nonprivileged A-file records, a right noncitizens in removal proceeds are
commonly deprived of.305
Congress should also approve the reallocation of already appropriated funds
to increase indigent asylum seekers’ access to counsel. 306 One such method
would be creating a pilot pro bono program in areas with high concentrations of
asylum and withholding claims, through which attorneys are appointed to
represent indigent applicants in their merits hearings before immigration judges
and appeals before the Board of Immigration Appeals; these attorneys would not
be compensated for their fees, but the allocated funds would reimburse them for
their costs.307 Considering that immigration judges are nearly thirteen times
more likely to find asylum eligibility in cases where the applicant is represented,
in addition to the immense stakes in these cases, this program would fulfill
numerous policy goals while also increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of
judicial review, and requiring only the nominal expenditure of already allocated
funds.
B. Recommendations for the Agency
The DHS should undertake rulemaking to allow noncitizens to have access to
asylum, regardless of a reinstated removal order. Indeed, a Petition for
Rulemaking is currently pending with the DHS, and as proposed in that Petition,
the DHS should amend the regulatory scheme to reflect that noncitizens with
reinstated removal orders who express a fear of removal are to be referred to an
asylum officer for a “credible” fear interview, rather than a “reasonable” fear
interview.308 Allowing asylum access will not place additional burdens on the
system, since noncitizens claiming fear in reinstatement are already being pre-

305. Id.; see also Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 373–74 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
government’s failure to furnish noncitizens in removal proceedings with their A-files violates due
process).
306. See also HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 43 (“To respect asylum seekers’ right to
access counsel, improve disposition of asylum claims, and better ensure that the U.S. does not
return people to countries where they face repression or torture . . . Congress should[] [a]pprove
reallocation of already appropriated funds to increase access to counsel for indigent asylum seekers
and those requesting protection under the Convention Against Torture . . . .”).
307. These attorneys may also receive reimbursement of their fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2012), by showing the government, including
the DHS and the judiciary, was not “substantially justified” in its litigation position.
308. NAT’L IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CTR. & AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, PETITION
FOR RULEMAKING TO PROMULGATE REGULATIONS VINDICATING THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO
SEEK ASYLUM NOTWITHSTANDING REINSTATEMENT OF REMOVAL ORDERS app. § 1–12 (Aug. 7,
2015), https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/Petition%2520for%2520Rulemaking
%2520Asylum%2520during%2520Reinstatement%2520FINAL.pdf (proposed amendments to
current regulations).

664

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 66:613

screened by CBP and subsequently interviewed by asylum officers. Nor will
allowing asylum access require significant additional government funding, since
both forms of relief offer similar government benefits. Allowing asylum access
will actually help conserve the DHS’s limited resources, such as by alleviating
its responsibility to process yearly work authorization requests filed by
noncitizens granted withholding of removal; this a requirement that continues in
perpetuity in the withholding context, but for only one year in the asylum
context, after which an asylee is eligible to apply for permanent residence.309
In the interim, or alternatively, the DHS should establish a policy by way of
public memorandum in which it instructs its officers to exercise prosecutorial
discretion to cancel or decline to enter reinstatement orders when a noncitizen
expresses fear of removal or the intent to apply for asylum. The DHS has already
exercised this discretion in cases like Yesenia’s, but only after she litigated her
case to the Ninth Circuit. Exercising this discretion from the outset will allow
the DHS to save considerable resources; the cost of litigating these cases at the
immigration court, BIA, and circuit court, in addition to the detention costs
during this time, are surely astronomical. 310 These resources could be better
allocated to solving the many, well-documented shortcomings within the DHS’s
purview, including CBP officers’ substantial, unabated noncompliance in
screening noncitizens in expedited removal, which the government already
expended significant resources in commissioning USCIRF’s research. 311 In
addition to the significant conservation of resources, declining to reinstate
expedited removal orders for noncitizens claiming a fear of return would prevent
the “grave injustice of depriving these individuals of the right to seek asylum on
their second attempt for the sole reason that they were wrongfully deprived of
that opportunity on their first try.”312

309. Id. at 5.
310. See, e.g., Antony Loewenstein, Private Prisons Are Cashing in on Refugees’ Desperation,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/25/opinion/private-prisons-arecashing-in-on-refugees-desperation.html?_r=0 (“As the number of migrants and asylum seekers
has grown . . . . [Detaining them] has become a multimillion-dollar industry.”); see also HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON 8
(2009), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-detenti
on-report.pdf (reporting that the government “does not precisely track the number of detained
asylum seekers or the actual length of their detention,” and estimating that the government spent
“more than $20,000 to detain a refugee from Haiti for four months”). Additionally, the Author has
won attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act amounting to more than
$16,000 for fees and costs associated with an asylum appeal from the BIA to the Ninth Circuit
alone. This award did not account for the government’s fees and costs in defending this appeal,
nor the significant litigation costs both sides expended in proceedings before the immigration court
and BIA, nor the resources the immigration judge, BIA, and Ninth Circuit judges expended.
311. To date, the DHS has implemented only one of USCIRF’s numerous recommendations.
See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY REPORT
CARD: 2 YEARS LATER 2 (2007) (“[T]wo years later, most of the Study’s recommendations have
not been implemented.”).
312. Human Rights Watch Letter, supra note 235.
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Moreover, as long as the current regulatory scheme remains in effect, the DHS
and the courts working with petitioners in withholding-only proceedings should
apply the plain language of the statute, requiring actual illegal reentry to trigger
the reinstatement provision, since currently, CBP initiates reinstatement
proceedings any time a noncitizen has a prior order of removal, including when
the noncitizen arrives at the border, and has therefore not effected an illegal
reentry.313
Finally, the DHS should undertake rulemaking to instruct CBP to follow the
same script in the reinstatement interview as CBP follows in the expedited
removal screening interview. The risk of removing a bona fide asylum seeker
is no less in reinstatement proceedings, and therefore the safeguards against
errant removal should be the same in both contexts. This will also create
consistency within CBP interviews, since the same form and questions will be
asked in any summary exclusion proceeding. Additionally, the DHS should
increase agency transparency by making the CBP’s electronic Officer Reference
Tool (ORT) available. It is unclear what guidance CBP currently follows; not
knowing the internal rules CBP officers follow is particularly troubling given
CBP’s refusal to comply with statutory and regulatory mandates.
C. Recommendations for the Judiciary
Federal courts presented with the issue of whether reinstatement of removal
orders bar asylum access should find that pursuant to statutory analysis of §§
1158 and 1231, the asylum provision is an exception to the reinstatement
provision’s general bar to “all relief,” and hold that any noncitizen may apply
for asylum, subject to the limited exceptions enumerated in § 1158. Based on
this statutory interpretation, federal courts should also find the withholding-only
regulation is invalid under Chevron. Not only will this give life to Congress’s
legislative intent, but it will also further the long-held policy goal of ensuring
asylum seekers are afforded protection in the U.S., a goal currently thwarted due
to widespread errors in the issuance of expedited removal orders, and
exacerbated by the reinstatement of these errant removal orders.
Immigration courts and the BIA, although bound to apply the withholdingonly regulation, should consider the overwhelming evidence of CBP
noncompliance in the screening of asylum seekers—particularly the evidence of
CBP discouraging noncitizens’ expression of fear, harassing those who do
express fear, and misrepresenting the noncitizen’s testimony on official forms—
and, accordingly, give no weight to records created during CBP and asylum
officer interviews. Not only is this in line with what some federal courts have
already commanded, this also comports with Congress’s intent that asylum
seekers in expedited removal be treated the same as other noncitizens seeking
asylum. Because asylum seekers who are not in expedited removal are not
interviewed by CBP, they are therefore not forced to overcome discrepancies
313. See, e.g., AILA Amicus Brief, supra note 112, at 14 n.8.
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arising from CBP records and subsequent credible fear records during their
merits hearing testimony before an immigration judge; these discrepancies
constitute one of the main reasons cited by immigration judges for denying
relief.314
Additionally, all courts should permit noncitizens to reopen their asylum
applications in extraordinary circumstances or when country conditions have
changed, notwithstanding a reinstated removal order. This is an explicitly
legislated exception to other legislated bars on access to asylum, and therefore
an applicable exception to the reinstatement bar. This is especially necessary
given the many errant removal orders entered in the expedited removal and
reinstatement processes.315
V. CONCLUSION
Reinstated removal orders should not bar noncitizens like Emely, who fled
horrific persecution in her home country and sought protection in the U.S., from
applying for asylum. Legislative history and the plain language of the INA show
that contrary to the Agency’s regulatory scheme that restricts Emely and
countless other noncitizens with reinstated removal orders to withholding of
removal relief, Congress did not intend for the reinstatement of removal
statutory provision to serve as a bar to asylum access. Instead, Congress
intended for asylum seekers to have the right to seek asylum even when placed
in summary exclusion proceedings.
Canons of statutory interpretation also support this conclusion; these
interpretive guides all point to an interpretation that treats the INA’s asylum
provision as an exception to the more general reinstatement of removal
provision, thereby allowing noncitizens with reinstated removal orders to seek
asylum. Because this interpretation directly conflicts with the Agency’s
interpretation as promulgated in the regulatory scheme, it is invalid under
Chevron.
Furthermore, the Agency’s interpretation is owed no judicial deference under
Chevron because the Agency’s interpretation yields absurd and manifestly
unjust results, especially given the ample evidence that expedited removal orders
are often errantly entered, in addition to the sobering reality that noncitizens who
experience persecution for the first time after being deported are forever barred
from seeking asylum protection.
If the six recommendations this Article makes are even partially implemented
by Congress, the Agency, and the judiciary, significant progress would be made
toward giving life to Congress’s legislative intent: to protect bona fide asylum
seekers who have fled persecution and torture and sought refuge in the Land of
the Free and Home of the Brave, a core value this country has embraced since
its founders arrived at America’s shores, having themselves fled persecution.
314. Id. at 19.
315. See discussion supra Section III.A.

